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LEGAL REFORM IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE: ANALYSIS
AND CRITIQUE OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND
OPERATION OF S. 487, THE TECHNOLOGY,
EDUCATION AND COPYRIGHT
HARMONIZATION (TEACH) ACT OF 2001
Tomas A. Lipinski*
This article presents an overview of current copyright law
as it applies to distance education as articulated in Section 110
1
of the Copyright Act, and an assessment of recent legislation
reforming that law.
This article does not discuss the
application of other provisions of the copyright law to distance
education, such as fair use (section 107), service provider
liability limitation (section 512(e)), or other legal issues
regarding the provision of distance education.
BACKGROUND: UNFINISHED BUSINESS FROM THE DMCA
(DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT)

Recent and major reform to existing copyright law is found
in the provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) of 1998. 2 The DMCA contains the online service
provider "immunity" provisions (actually a liability limitation
as opposed to true immunity) of section 512 and the infamous

* Tomas A. Lipinski, J.D., LL.M., Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor and Co-Director of
the Center for Information Policy Research, School of Information Studies, University
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. He received his law degree form Marquette University Law
School, his master of law (LL.M.) from John Marshall Law School, and his doctorate
from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He researches, teaches, publishes, and speaks widely on the issues of information and Internet law and policy, including copyright. His recent publication, entitled Librarian's Guide to Copyright for
Shared and Networked Resources, was published in January/February 2002 as part of
the American Library Association TechSource Library Technology Report Series.
1. Unless otherwise indicated, statute references are to sections of the copyright
law, Title 17 of the United States Code.
2. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (Digital Millennium Copyright Act
CDMCA)).
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anti-trafficking and anti-circumventing rules of section 1201. 3
Congress accomplished much with the DMCA, but its attempt
at copyright modernization was still incomplete. Perhaps
because the divergent views of stakeholders-copyright owners
like publishers versus copyright users like schools-could not
be reconciled, or perhaps because Congress simply ran out of
time, distance education reform, specifically amendment of §
110(2), was left undone. 4 Section 110 contains a number of
limitations on performance and display rights of copyright
owners; one of its practical effects expands educators' ability to
use copyrighted materials in the classroom without having to
obtain permission or pay additional fees for what would
otherwise be an unauthorized public performance and display
of the copyrighted work. This fact did not go unnoticed by the
legislature. In the DMCA, Congress specifically instructed the
U.S. Register of Copyrights to assess the current viewpoints of
stakeholders, analyze the options, and make recommendations
for legislative reform within six months after the date of
enactment, 5 which is encapsulated in The Copyright Office
Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education. 6
The sustained effort of distance education reform advocates
has reached fruition. Reform to 17 U.S.C. § 110(2), the
Technology, Education and Copyright Harmonization (TEACH)
Act of2002
3. For a thorough and critical review of Sections 512 and 1201, see Jay Dratler,
Jr. Cyberlaw: Intellectual Property in the Digital Millennium (L.,J. Press 2002). For a
brief review, see Tomas A. Lipinski, Legal Issues in Web-Based Distance Education, in
Handbook of American Distance Education (Michael G. Moore & William G. Anderson,
eds., forthcoming, Mar. 2003).
4. See also Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 5 (June 5, 2001) ("In the five years leading up to
the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998, the application
of copyright law to distance education using digital technologies was the subject of public debate and attention in the United States. Extensive discussion concerning the issue was conducted during Congress' consideration of the DMCA, but no conclusion was
reached." (footnote omitted)).
5. See DMCA, section 403 ("Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment
of this Act, the Register of Copyrights, after consultation with representatives of copyright owners, nonprofit educational institutions, and nonprofit libraries and archives,
shall submit to the Congress recommendations on how to promote distance education
through digital technologies, including interactive digital networks, while maintaining
an appropriate balance between the rights of copyright owners and the needs of users
of copyrighted works. Such recommendations shall include any legislation the Re!,rister
of Copyrights considers appropriate to achieve the objective described in the preceding
sentence.").
6. The Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education, Sen.
Hrg., 106-539 U.S. Copy. Off. 96 (Comm. on the Jud. May 25, 1999).
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updates the distance education provision of the
Copyright Act for the 21st Century. The Act allows
students and teachers to benefit from deployment in
education of advanced digital transmission technologies
like the Internet, while introducing safeguards to limit
the additional risks to copyright owners that are
inherent in exploiting works in digital format. 7
The TEACH Act passed in the Senate on June 6, 2001, and
was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on June
13, 2001. The House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property approved the bill for full committee
action on July 11 and was reported by the House Committee on
the Judiciary on September 25. TEACH eventually became
1
part of H.R. 2215, the 21" Century Department of Justice
Appropriations Authorization Act, and was signed into law by
8
President George W. Bush on November 2, 2002.
This article analyzes and critiques the TEACH Act. The
changes contemplated by TEACH represent a drastic departure
from 17 U.S.C § 110(2) as it existed under previous law.
TEACH requires educational institutions to meet new
standards and continues to perpetuate a somewhat "lesser
citizen" status to educators and students in distance education
environments.
THE PRIOR (LEGAL) CLIMATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION:
UNDERSTANDING "THE OLD" 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)

Laws written before digital and Internet media permeated
classrooms hamper schools' efforts to increase classroom and
instructional technology. Through new technologies, teachers
and students can interact with sound and motion (video), in
addition to complex graphical interfaces, both synchronously
and asynchronously without ever leaving home or office.
However, this type of teaching, just like, if not more than,
traditional modes of face-to-face instruction, often raises issues
of copyright law. Under§ 107 ofthe copyright law, a concept of
fair use generally applies to uses of copyrighted works in
educational settings, but it is not determinative of whether the
use is ultimately fair or not. There are four fair use factors
7. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 3 (June 5, 2001).
8. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301.
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that must be balanced to determine whether a particular use of
a copyrighted work is a fair use under section 107 of copyright
law, 9 and the educational purpose of the use is just one of those
factors. In other words, every educational use of copyrighted
material is not automatically a fair use of that work under the
law. In fact, when passing the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress
explicitly rejected this construction. 10 When virtual outreach
involves formal instructional services that incorporate the use
of, and access to, copyrighted works, other sections of the
copyright law are sought for additional "use" rights beyond
those of the § 107 "fair use" grant. 11 Anytime a teaching
interaction is broadcast to students at a remote location or
transmitted via Web technology to a distributed or virtual
classroom (or even used in front of a live classroom), it is likely
that the public performance and display right of the copyright
owner is implicated. Copyrights are implicated when a portion
of text, a map, a chart, an article from a periodical, or any other
visual aid is displayed, or when a work is performed (e.g., a
video clip shown or a portion of a work read aloud). In
educational settings, section 110(2) provides for the grant of
additional "use" (public performance or display) rights. 12
TEACH is a responsive piece of legislation, and "the ability
of the United States to meet its domestic and international
9. The text of section 107 is as follows: "Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-- (1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. See also John W Hazard Jr., Copyright Law in Business and Practice, 'li 8.01-8.03, at 8-2-8-75 (Prentice Hall 2000).
10. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, (Sept. 3, 1976) (Reprinted in U.S. Copyright Office Circular 21: Reproduction of Copyrighted works by Educators and Librarians, 7 (1993).
("The Committee also adheres to its earlier conclusion, that a specific exemption freeing certain reproductions of copyrighted works for educational and scholarly purposes
from copyright control is not justified.").
11. Carol M. Silberberg, Preserving Educational Fair Use in the Twenty-First
Century, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 617, 618 (2001); Michele J. Le Moal-Gray, Distance Education and Intellectual Property: The Realities of Copyright Law and the Culture of
Higher Education, 16 Touro L. R. 981, 1007 (2000).
12. 17 u.s.c. § 110(2)
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challenges and responsibilities is directly dependent on its
educational capacity." 13 TEACH demonstrates the need to
think "beyond the box" of institutional education, in terms of
students ("lifelong learning"), place ("in the workplace, at
home"), and time ("at times selected by students to meet their
needs"). 14 To understand the dramatic departure that TEACH
represents, and why some advocate it is long overdue, this
article discusses the structure of previous distance education
law as expressed in 17 U.S.C. § 110(2). Additionally, this
article discusses the contrast between the structure of distance
education law and that of copyright law regarding public
performance or display of materials in so-called live or
traditional classroom settings (the law uses the phrase "face-toface teaching activities") under 17 U.S.C. § 110(1).
By
contrasting the current rights of educators in "live" class
settings with those of their remote or distance education
counterparts, an understanding of the claims of disparity and
the perhaps incomplete rectification that TEACH promises is
possible.
17 U.S.C. § 110 provides certain categories ofusers, such as
educators, with additional use rights for public performances
and displays of copyrighted works. In general, the performance
(e.g. reciting part of a play or showing a video), or display of
material (e.g. hanging or holding up a map) in the school
library media center, classroom, or on a Web site (e.g.
broadcasting the recitation of the play, streaming the video
over the Internet, or posting a digital copy of a map onto the
class web site) requires permission from the copyright owner.
A so-called public performance or display right would be
needed, unless after considering the four § 107 factors (nature
of the work, nature of the use, amount of the work used, and
market impact of the use), the use is classified as a "fair use."
17 U.S.C. § 110 was created to simplify the laborious and
uncertain application of fair use.
17 U.S.C. § 110 gives nonprofit educational institutions
additional "use" rights. While the rights under § 110 apply to
all performances and displays made during a teaching
interaction, the right could also apply to school media centers
or libraries if those places are used for "systematic
instructional activities" within the school. These use rights are
13. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 3.
14. Id. at 4.
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not given to other nonprofit libraries, such as public libraries
that might engage in community targeted educational pursuits,
nor are they given to educational institutions that are forprofit, such as dance studios or language schools. As a result,
17 U.S.C. § 110, at least with regard to subsections (1) and (2),
is best characterized as an educator's provision, rather than a
library provision. However, it might affect the school library or
media center if the locale otherwise qualifies for § 110(2)
performances or displays. 15 As discussed below,§ 110 would not
apply to something like the playing of a Disney video to keep
toddlers occupied while parents participate in the parentteacher conferences of older siblings.
Unlike
the
three
exclusive
rights 16-reproduction,
preparation of derivative works, and distribution-the right of
public performance applies only to specified categories of
copyrighted material within the works of authorship range:
literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works;
pantomimes, motion pictures, and other audiovisual works;
and sound recordings. There is an exclusive right to perform
sound recordings publicly but only if the performance is
through a digital audio transmission. 17 Performance rights do
15. See H.R. Rpt. No. 94-1476, at 56-57 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. §
110 (1995), Historical and Statutory Notes). This expanded treatment is consistent
with other discussion of the legislative history. For example, the use of the word
"teacher" in the Classroom Guidelines is broad enough to cover school media specialist
or school librarian. See Cong. Rec. Sll (Sept. 26, 1976). (Reprinted in: U.S. Copyright
Office Circular 21: Reproduction of Copyrighted works by Educators and Librarians, 7
(1993)("[T]he committee regards the concept of 'teacher' as broad enough to include instructional specialists working in consultation with actual instructors.").
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
17. Section 106(6) covers the performance of sound recordings and provides for
the exclusive right by the copyright owner to "perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission." 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2002). Sound recordings
"are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds,
but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002). Sound recordings in essence capture the rendering of an original expression, the presentation of a speech or
lecture, the singing or playing of a musical work, or the reading of a text or other literary work. Unless the expression is completely ad lib or spontaneous, sound recordings
are often based on a pre-existing work, and are therefore a form of derivative work.
For example, a CD of Basil Rathbone reading a Sherlock Homes story is a sound recording, and thus by its nature, derivative of a literary work, i.e., the original Arthur
Conan Doyle tale.
Under the 1976 Act there was no performance right in a sound recording. Because of this anomaly there is an increased chance of infringement of the underlying
protected elements when a performance of a sound recording is made in a digital envi-
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ronment. (See S. Rep. No. 128, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1995), reprinted in U.S.
Cong.& Admin. News 356, 361 (1995)). In 1995 Congress passed the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act (DPRSRA) (Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336-44
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106, 114, 115, 119, 801-803)) in order to stave the development of digital delivery technologies from leading to widespread abuse and to grant
to the copyright owners some control over the "ways in which their creative works are
used." !d., at 357. As a result of DPRSRA, there is now a performance right in sound
recordings, but only when the performance is done by means of a digital audio transmission. Unfortunately, section 110, enacted in 1976 (years before the addition of the
digital audio transmission amendment), was not one of the sections amended by
DPRSRA. In other words the performance right granted to educators in existing section
110(2) does not apply to sound recordings, but only to the underlying non-dramatic literary and musical work on which sound recordings might be based. However, 17
U.S.C. § 114 contains significant exceptions to the DPRSA copyright owner's right and
indicates that non-subscription "broadcast" digital transmissions of sound recordings
are exempted outright. See 17 U.S. C. § 114(d)(l)(A).
It could be argued that most "transmissions" a school would make are also not
considered to be "broadcasts" for purposes of section 114 (the section which elucidates
the nature of the DPRSA right), as qualifying broadcast transmissions pertain only to
those transmissions "made by a terrestrial broadcast station licensed as such by the
Federal Communications Commission." 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(3). See also, S. Rep. No. 128,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S. Gong. & Admin. News 356,
366. ("Under this provision [section ll4(d)(l)(A)J, any transmission to members of the
public that is neither a subscription transmission (as defined in section 114(j)(8)) nor
part of an interactive service is exempt from the new digital performance right"). As a
result, while some of the activities of an educational institution could conceivably qualify (i.e., having a licensed broadcast station within its organizational structure), most
would not. If it did have a broadcast service to facilitate distance learning and it was
non-subscription (limited participants and paid), then the service would be exempted
from the performance right under section 114(d)(l)(A). Moreover, if the transmission is
a retransmission of a nonsubscription broadcast transmission, then section
114(d)(l)(B)(iv) contains an exception for those circumstances where the "radio station's broadcast transmission is made by a noncommercial educational broadcast station . . . " As a result, "(d]istance education activities that entail digital 'broadcast
transmissions' of sound recordings will not be subject to the section 106(6) performance
right." The Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education, Sen.
Hrg., 106-539, 96 (U.S. Copy. Of( May 25, 1999).
Second, subscription transmissions not exempt under (d)(l), e.g. a nonbroadcast
transmission, and eligible nonsubscription transmissions are eligible for statutory licensing. While it might be tempting to hypothesize that most distance education
transmission might be nonsubscription, a closer examination must be made. "Certain
distance education activities could entail subscription transmissions (transmissions
that are controlled and limited to particular recipients, and for which payment is required)." Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education, Sen.
Hrg., 106-539, 96 (U.S. Copy. Of( May 25, 1999).96 (1999) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)). It
would appear that a distance education web class on music appreciation, for example,
that has digital or digitized sound recordings available for students to stream and hear
as part of the class, while not meeting the statutory definition of a broadcast, would
nonetheless arguably be a subscription transmission under section 114(j)(14) defining
subscription transmission as it "is controlled and limited to particular recipients [i.e.,
members of the class through password access as is typical on distance education web
sites], and for which consideration is required to be paid or otherwise given by or on
behalf of the recipients to receive the transmission or a package of transmissions including the transmission" [i.e., student tuition payments]. Even if it is argued that the
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not apply to pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works because
these must be displayed instead of performed. On the other
hand, both performance and display rights govern literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographical works as well as
pantomimes because they can be displayed and performed.
Further, performance rights apply to motion pictures and other
audiovisual works when images are shown sequentially, while
display rights apply to works when the images are shown nonsequentially or individually.
Thus, the showing of a
videocassette (either by broadcasting it to a remote class
location, such as to students in a neighboring school district, or
by converting it into digital format and loading it on a distance
education class site that is accessed by students in multiple
states) would not be authorized under pre-TEACH 17 U.S.C. §
110(2). These constitute "public performances of an audiovisual
work," and as discussed below, performances under 110(2) were
limited to non-dramatic literary or musical works.
The § 106 rights of performance and display apply only to
"public" performances and displays 18 • "To perform or display a
work 'publicly' means to perform or display it at a place open to
the public or at any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered."19 This is a location determinative
transmission would be a nonsubscription transmission, in either case under section
114(d)(2)(C) an "eligible nonsubscription transmission or a subscription transmission
not exempt under paragraph (1)" may not publish advance play lists. If the music selections are listed in the course syllabus, then either the eligible nonsubscription
transmission or a subscription transmission not exempt under paragraph (1) cannot
"cause to be published, or induce or facilitate the publication, by means of an advance
program schedule or prior announcement, the titles of the specific sound recordings to
be transmitted, the phonorecord embodying such sound recordings, or, other than for
illustrative purposes, the names of the featured recording artists . . ." 17 U.S. C. §
114(d)(2)(C)(ii).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002); What is the nature of the performance right? "To 'perform' a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means
of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible." 17
U.S.C. § 101. Other items in the classroom may be displayed: "To 'display' a work
means to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image,
or any other device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, to show individual images nonsequentially." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Some categories of
works can be performed, although others can only be displayed; you cannot perform a
piece of sculpture, nor can you display a song. A performance in a classroom could be
the showing of an episode from the HBO series "Band of Brothers," a reading of a chapter from Great Gats by, or the singing of a Bernstein song.
19. 17 U.S. C. § 101 (2002).

95]

LEGAL REFORM IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE

103

clause. The definition of "public" encompasses a wide range of
classroom or educational settings. While a classroom may not
necessarily be open to the public, it is still covered by the
concept of public performance or display under the second
"outside the normal circle of family or social acquaintances is
gathered" proviso. It does not matter if the group of students in
the classroom know each other, or if those gathered in the
school library working on a project are socially acquainted with
each other; the trigger is that the performance or display is
made at a place open to the public or where people beyond the
family or social acquaintances might gather. Students in a
classroom or school library meet this definition.
Any
educational setting would, at the very least, qualify for the
second proviso. Some school settings might also qualify for the
first "place open to the public" proviso. A university library
would surely meet this criterion, as might its classrooms, while
a K-12 environs arguably might not. 20 However, in cases where
a rural K-12 media center serves as a library for both the
public school and the community at large, it becomes open to
the public.
17 U.S.C. § 110 governs public performances and displays
of copyrighted materials in classroom and related settings.
Although the mirroring of an instructor's material from live
face-to-face settings into on-line settings (the educational "use"
rights provided under § 110(1) and discussed below) is
completely logical, the previous formulation of§ 110(2) did not
20. The operative sub-clause of the "publicly" definition is triggered when the
performance or display is transmitted or communicated to a place specified by the "location clause" ("place open to the public" or "gathered"), however an additional trigger
of "publicly" can be made by performances or displays "to the public, by means of any
device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time
or at different times." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002). This is an action (transmission or communication) clause. Thus, if a school allows patrons to view videos in the cafeteria during lunch period, it would trigger the location clause but not necessarily the action
clause. However, if the school placed elevated television monitors in each corner of the
main reading room, and allowed students to tune into MTV during a recreational reading period, this would in theory trigger the action (transmission or communication)
clause. This article discusses when under sections 110(1) or 110(2) such performance
or displays might be allowed in educational settings. However, in the latter example,
section 110(5) might still allow the public performance or display of such "transmissions" (the television monitor in the reading area scenario), but a thorough discussion
of the subsection is beyond the scope of this article. Of course it is the "transmission or
communication" proviso that would make performances and displays of distance education course content (students at home or at work in a virtual class) "public" in the sense
of the copyright owner's section 106 rights.
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appear to offer such flexibility. Moreover, by design, § 110(2)
accomplished an opposite goal, often with harsh results.
Pre-TEACH 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) governed the use of
copyrighted materials "by or in the course of a transmission,"
and by its simple terms applied to distance education
environments. However, § 110(2) contained many practical
limitations on the use of copyrighted material in the modern
virtual Internet classroom. While the use of the word
"transmission" could be interpreted broadly enough to apply to
the dominant distance education web-based instruction today,
the 1976 legislative history (House Report) entitled the
discussion of § 110(2) with the words "Instructional
Broadcasting." When the 1976 Copyright Act was enacted, the
operative vision of distance education was to have a class
session in one location broadcast to students gathered in a
classroom at another location. The language of § 110(2),
unchanged since it was enacted in 1976, TEACH
notwithstanding, belied the "stuck in time" nature of its many
limitations. The most significant limitations are discussed
below and are related to concepts of material or copyrighted
works, institutional "systematic instructional activities,"
content integration, and location.
First, the opening phrase of§ 110(2) limited the works that
may be performed in a transmission to two categories:
nondramatic literature (e.g. reading from a text) and music
(e.g. singing a song). "Thus, the copyright owner's permission
would be required for the performance on educational
television or radio of a dramatic work, of a dramatic-musical
work such as an opera or musical comedy, or of a motion
picture.'m There was no limitation, however, on the display of
a work. 22
There is no limitation on the category of works that may be
displayed under 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2) by, or in the course of a
transmission, but by definition, this right applies to a small
category of copyrighted works in the remote classroom. 23 In
21. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 83 (Sept 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin.
News 5659, 5697 (1995)).
22. Performances are limited to "nondramatic literary or musical works" but no
such limitation of categories of works exists under the plain text of pre-TEACH, the
statute merely read: "or display of a work." 17 U.S. C. § 110(2) (2002).
23. The copyright law recognizes eight categories of works: literary works, including computer code; musical works including accompanying words; dramatic works, including accompanying music; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic,
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other words, certain works can, by legal operation as much as
by logic, only be performed24 while others can only be
displayed. 25 For example, one cannot logically display a sound
recording26 or perform a sculpture, but one can display a
photograph or perform an audio-visual work such as a
filmstrip. Thus, the limitation on the type of work used in the
virtual classroom was just one of the hurdles in applying preTEACH § 110(2) to distance education. While maps, charts
and other visual teaching reinforcement tools could be used
because they constitute displays, a video cannot be shown
because it falls outside the section 110(2) performance
category. 27
Second, the performance or display must be part of the
"systematic instructional activities" of the nonprofit
educational institution. 28 For example, pre-TEACH 17 U.S.C. §
110(2) might not have supported the broadcast of copyrighted
materials (performance or display) as part of a school's
orientation activities or commencement exercises. The
legislative history suggests the "concept of 'systematic
and sculptural, so-called static-visual works; motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, so-called active visual works; sound recordings; and architectural works. 17
U.S.C. § 102 (2002).
24. Performance can apply to literary works; musical works; dramatic works;
pantomimes and choreographic works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
and sound recordings. Limiting section 110(2) performances to nondramatic literary
and musical works eliminates the majority of "performance oriented" works. "[F]or
example, a performer could read a nondramatic literary work aloud under section
110(2), but the copyright owner's permission would be required for him to act it out in
dramatic form." IJ.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 83 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.&
Admin. News 5659, 5697 (1995)).
25. Display can apply to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural and architectural
works.
26. In general, sound recordings have no performance right. You can always play
a LP record, but the underlying music (musical work) of the composer remains protected, but of course, performance of a musical work was one of the rights granted by
the pre-TEACH section 110(2) right. In addition, a sound recording has a performance
right when the recording is performed by digital audio transmission. 17 U.S.C. §
106(6). When Congress amended Section 106 in 1996, adding the performance right in
sound recording via a digital audio transmission, it added a definition of digital audio
transmission to mean "a transmission in whole or in part in a digital or other
nonanalog format." This definition is not terribly helpful but "plausibly implicate[s]
most of the major conduits by [which] Americans now receive information, including
television and radio broadcast, telecommunications, cable and fiber optics, direct satellite services, and even online interactive services." Hazard, supra n. 9, at 4-41.
27. The only two categories of works that could be performed were "nondramtic
literary or musical works" 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) (2002).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(A) (2002).
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instructional activities' is intended as the general equivalent of
'curriculums,' but it could be broader in a case like that of an
institution using systematic teaching methods not related to
specific course work." 29 This definition is unclear, but it could
be interpreted to allow for the use (performance or display) of
copyrighted material in the instruction of basic distance
technologies that are not part of "specific course work."
Perhaps transmitting web-based instructional technology, or
transmitting an opening university orientation to remote
campus locations or to distance students would have qualified
under the previous § 110(2) performance and display right. The
activities, if not within the actual curriculum of a course, would
still to have been "in accordance with the pattern of teaching
established by the governmental body or institution."30 Thus, it
seems a performance or display of copyrighted material as part
of an orientation or commencement would not be allowed and
would require either permission from the copyright owner or
the "purchase" of a specific performance or display right.
Subsection 110(2)(B) also required that the "performance of
a nondramatic literary or musical work or display of a work be
directly related and of material assistance to the teaching
content of the transmission." 31 The legislative history of the
1976 Act offers little assistance in understanding the second
substantive requirement of § 110(2) found in § 110(2)(B).
However, the 2001 legislative history of TEACH retains the
110(2)(B) requirement using the same exact language and
numerical-alpha statutory section designation. This suggests
that
[t]he requirement of subparagraph (2)(B), that the
performance or display must be directly related and of
material assistance to the teaching content of the
transmission, is found in current law [referring to preTEACH 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(B)], and has been retained in
its current form [referring to TEACH provision 17
U.S.C. § 110(2)(B)]. As noted in the Register's Report
[footnote omitted], this test of relevance and materiality
connects the copyrighted work to the curriculum, and it
means that the portion performed or displayed may not
be performed or displayed for the mere entertainment of
29. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 83 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Gong.& Admin.
News 5659, 5697 (1995)).
30. !d.
31. 17 U.S. C. § 110(2)(B) (2002).
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the students, or as unrelated background material. 32
The 2001 legislative history of TEACH suggests the
"directly related and of material assistance" clause in 17 U.S. C.
§ 110(2)(B) is the language (whether 1976 or 2001 TEACH)
that would prevent a teacher from performing a work for the
"mere entertainment" of his or her students. The 1976
legislative history does make reference to the disallowance of a
classroom performance or display under § 110, if the purpose is
33
for "recreation or entertainment." And that reference is made
as an interpretation of the § 110(1) live classroom "face-to-face
teaching activities" phrasing instead of in the discussion of the
§ 110(2) remote student or distance education right.
The "directly related and of material assistance" language
of 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(B), enacted in 1976 but not explained
until 2001, and the "face-to-face teaching activities" of the 1976
enacted § 110(1) both prevent entertainment uses of
copyrighted material in the classroom without permission. As
a result of this recent clarification, the 1976 legislative history
interprets § 110(1) as prohibiting performances or displays
"that are given for the recreation or entertainment of any part
of their audience," while the 2001 TEACH legislative history
makes a similar assertion by saying that performances and
plays "may not be performed or displayed for the mere
entertainment of the students or as unrelated background
material" for§ 110(2).
Moreover, as the 1976 legislative history makes the
relevance and materiality requirement of 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)
implicit in § 110(1) by interpreting its "teaching activities"
language to exclude recreational or entertainment use of
material, the legislative history of TEACH explicitly makes
clear that the "directly related and of material assistance"
language of§ 110(2) also excludes material for the purposes of
"entertainment" or "unrelated background material."34 As a
result, the "teaching activities" and "directly related and of
material assistance" phrases accomplish the same or similar
entertainment use restriction but use different statutory
32. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, 10-11 (June 5, 2001) (italics added).
33. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 81 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin.
News 5659, 5695 (1995)) ("but they do not included performances or displays, whatever
their cultural value or intellectual appeal, that are given for the recreation or entertainment of any part of their audience.").
34. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, 10-11 (June 5, 2001).
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language.:35
While it is obvious that 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) cannot by
operation apply to live on-site teaching because it targets
performances or displays by or in the course of a transmission,
the § 110(1) phrasing of "teaching activities" did not appear
anywhere in the pre-TEACH section 110(2) or in the version of
110(2) enacted under TEACH. The section 110(2) relevance
("directly related") and materiality ("and of material assistance
to the teaching content") requirement should by logic apply to
any performance or display of copyrighted material in the
classroom, including distance scenarios. Under § 110(2),
however, only the legislative history of TEACH makes the
requirement explicit (at least as far as a Senate or House
Committee Report can make it so). 36
The impact of the TEACH legislative history may stretch
beyond the 2001 amendment. The commentary may suggest a
slight re-interpretation of the 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) "recreation or
entertainment" prohibition for live ("face-to-face) students
under § 110(1). Since these uses were disallowed under the
1976 legislative history, and since the 2001 legislative history
language in § 110(2)(B) also prohibits such uses in distance
settings, the explanation provided in the recent 2001
commentary regarding the general nature of the "mere
entertainment" prohibition might further expand the
application of its similar prohibition vis-a-vis § 110(1). In other
words, the committee discussion in 2001 can be used to further
interpret the intent of the 1976 commentary prohibiting
similar unnecessary performances and displays. If this is true,
the § 110(1) prohibition (like the § 110(2)(B) prohibition as
indicated by the TEACH legislative history) might also prohibit
35. The "teaching activities" language of section 110(1) enacted in 1976 is interpreted to mean that the performance and display right granted by section110(1) do not
apply to those uses "whatever their cultural value or intellectual appeal, that are given
for the recreation or entertainment of any part of their audience."). H.R. Rpt. 94-14 76,
at 81 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin. News 5659, 5695 (1995)). While
the "directly related and of material assistance" phrasing used in pre-TEACH section
110(2)(B), also enacted in 1976 and retained in TEACH section 110(2)(B) accomplish
the same or similar entertainment use restriction but use different statutory language
to do so. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, 10-11 (June 5, 2001) ("the portion performed or displayed
may not be performed or displayed for the mere entertainment of the students, or as
unrelated background material.").
36. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, 10-11 (June 5, 2001). The House Report uses the same language to describe the operation of TEACH section 110(2)(B). H. Rpt. No. 107-687, 107th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002).
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performances and displays of copyrighted works that qualify as
"unrelated background material."
Whether or not this additional prohibition ("unrelated
background material") applies to § 110(1) uses as well as to §
110(2)(B) uses requires an understanding of what "unrelated
background material" might be. Might it prohibit the posting of
a background article to the class, which is analogous to a
teacher passing around an article during a face-to-face
encounter with students? Would a junior high school class
studying To Kill a Mockingbird be allowed to view (display)
ornithological material on mockingbirds because it qualifies as
related background material, while similar material on poverty
in a rural southern town or on a recipe for corn bread might not
be allowed because it is unrelated background material?
Defining unrelated background material becomes difficult.
Does "unrelated" modify "background," or is the phrasing
redundant, making the statute exclude unrelated material that
is only background in nature (in which case both postings
might be excluded)?
Arguably, "related" as opposed to "unrelated" background
material could still be acceptable under the TEACH Senate and
House Committee Reports. If so, what is the point of the
phrase "background material?"
When does background
material, which by definition always seems to have relevance
to the curriculum, move from an unacceptable "unrelated"
category to an acceptable "related" category? Would use of
material on the European Holocaust in a World War II unit be
related background material, while the use of material on the
Armenian or Kurdish genocide be unrelated background
material? The interpretation would be more precise if either
the prohibition material included "unrelated material" alone or
the TEACH § 110(2) right was more restrictive by prohibiting §
110(2) from applying to all "background material." Excluding
"unrelated background material" appears to accomplish
nothing more than confusion.
Finally, under the pre-TEACH language of§ 110(2)(C), it is
unclear whether the rights granted to educators in § 110(2)
allowed the transmission over the Internet of a performance or
display of copyrighted material under the most prevalent oneto-one distance education model (that is, remote broadcast to
individual students at separate locations, via home or work
computers). The traditional one-to-many mode broadcast model
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is reflected by the 1976 formulation of§ 110(2) and operates as
a significant limitation in many current distance education
scenarios. Yet this contrasts with the wide range of rights an
educator has in a live class under § 110(1), which are discussed
below.
Pre-TEACH 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(c) indicated that a
qualifying transmission must be made "primarily" to only one
of three categories of locations or persons. First, and of most
relevance to the present discussion, pre-TEACH § 110(2)(C)(i)
indicated that the reception must be made primarily for
"reception in the classroom or similar places normally devoted
to instruction." Pre-TEACH § 110(2)(C)(ii) and (iii) allowed
transmissions to those with disabilities or government
employees who cannot physically attend class. 37
Under pre-TEACH 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(C), factors
determining whether the purpose of a transmission were
"primarily" for one of the permissible designated groups
include: 1) traditional classroom students, 2) disabled or other
special student groups such as preschool children, displaced
workers, illiterates, and shut-ins, or 3) government employees
as part of a training exercise-include "subject matter, content
and the time" of the transmission. 38 That the public at large
might also be able to receive the transmission does not
disqualify its use under the Section 110(2) exemption.
The 1976 legislative history suggests the purpose behind
the initial transmission is the determining factor.
For
example, what if the transmission is made for regular students
or disabled learners, but the mode of technology allows others
to also pick up the transmission? That others might intercept
the transmission is acceptable and the performance or display
of qualifying copyrighted materials is allowed. However, a
transmission made for the public at large, where the
educational institution intends to piggyback or incorporate the
broadcast into its curriculum, is not allowed. For instance, an
37. 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(C)(i)-(iii) (1995) (under (ii) to "persons to whom the transmission is directed because their disabilities or other special circumstances prevent
their attendance in classrooms or similar places normally devoted to instruction" or
third under (iii) to "officers or employees of governmental bodies as a part of their official duties or employment").
38. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 83 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin.
News 5659, 5697-98 (1995)) ("Factors to consider in determining the 'primary' purpose
of a program would include its subject matter, content, and the time of its transmission.").
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educational fire safety program produced under the preTEACH § 110(2) rules by the local fire department and
broadcast on the local access cable channel that includes a
segment of firefighters singing a rendition of the Talking
Heads "Burning Down the House" (performance of a musical
work) would not be acceptable. In the latter case, that some
people in the qualifying group (children at the local public
school as part of a public safety class) can receive the
transmission will not save the broadcaster from liability. The
firefighters either have to seek permission to sing the song (as
it does not qualify for the § 110(2) right), argue that fair use
allows the performance of the song, or seek permission from
the copyright owner. However, the legislative history makes
clear that "instructional television college credit courses ...
aimed at undergraduate and graduate students in earnest
pursuit of higher educational degrees [qualify as long as] these
broadcasts are aimed at regularly enrolled students and are
39
conducted by recognized higher education institutions." Again,
the 1976 Act envisioned the world of distance education in the
traditional broadcast mode. While the traditional broadcast
mode is still in use and not completely outdated, broadcast is
disappearing quickly.
Were transmissions to students in the contemporary
distance education model, a model that anticipates that most
students access the material from their personal computer
stations at home or the office, included in the pre-TEACH §
110(2)(C)(i) "primarily" requirement? No. The plain language
of § 110(2) did not allow use of the one-to-one transmission
mode. Although the transmission needs only to be made
primarily in "classrooms or similar places normally devoted to
instruction," did this requirement offer enough legal breathing
room for participants and instructors in the contemporary oneto-one distance education model, or does this limitation
prohibit transmission to distance students at home or at work?
Pre-TEACH section 110(2) apparently prohibited transmissions
to the students at home or working, since the transmission is
not primarily to a classroom or similar place normally devoted
to instruction. While a bedroom or office might be the only
place (or at least the primary place) where a particular
distance student of the twenty-first century receives his or her
:39. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 84 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin.
News 5659, 5698 (1995)) .
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remote instruction, the bedroom or office unfortunately is not a
"classroom" nor is it "a place normally devoted to" that
instruction. Because the 1976 formulation of§ 110(2) required
that transmission be made primarily for "receptions in
classrooms or similar places normally devoted to instruction," a
school could broadcast a performance of a literary work to
another school as part of a team-taught course, but it could not
broadcast the performance to students who take the course
from home. This standard of the traditional classroom is an
objective standard, not one based on the subjective concept of
the virtual student. The inability to apply § 110(2) to the
typical distance education session prompted many to call for
legislative reform. As a result of these limitations, efforts to
amend the subsection to allow for an expansion of the
categories of § 110(2) works available for performance and
display in the classroom and an expansion of the places where
such receptions can be received continued. 40
Finally, although 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) requires that "in that
case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work" the
performance or display must be made by means of a copy that
was lawfully made (see discussion below), no such language
appears in the current version of § 110(2). The § 110(1)
"unlawfully made" copy proviso is triggered when the "person
responsible for the performance knew or had reason to believe"
the version of the work used was an unlawfully made copy.
The lack of this specific requirement in pre-TEACH § 110(2)
might tempt one to conclude that if the chapters from a book
that were first reproduced (digitized) by the school before it
was transmitted (displayed) to distance students exceeded fair
use (and was not otherwise a lawful copy) and the instructor
suspected the use was unlawful, it would not matter for
purposes of § 110(2) applicability because § 110(2) does not
contain such restricting language. It follows that an instructor
could use an unlawful and infringing copy (under § 107, one
that exceeds fair use, for example) of a work to undertake a
lawful display to remote students under § 110(2). This result
seems odd and, as explained in' the discussion of TEACH below,
was unintended. More likely, Congress simply did not
anticipate the current state of distance education where digital
is common and thus where the likelihood of appropriating an
40. Sen. Jud. Comm., The Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education, Sen. Hrg., 106-539, 106" Cong. 140-70 (May 25, 1999).
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infringing copy for educational use is also more common and
wrote the language of § 110(2) when distance education
consisted of remote television broadcasting and no need existed
to convert most works into digital format for transmission to
remote students.
SECOND CLASS CITIZENS: VIEWING 17 U.S. C. § 110(2) IN
CONTRAST TO THE RIGHTS AFFORDED FACE-TO-FACE TEACHING
UNDER 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) AND PRIOR LAW

Section 110(1) provides that the following are not infringing
activities:
the performance or display of a work by instructors or
pupils in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of
a nonprofit educational institution, in a classroom, or
similar place devoted to instruction, unless, in the case
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, the
performance, or the display of individual images, is
given by means of a copy that was not lawfully made
under this title, and that the person responsible for the
performance knew or had reason to believe was not
lawfully made. 41
Several points should be made regarding the provisions of
this subsection: the who, what, and where of its requirements,
the allowance given to educators in "live, face-to-face settings"
by implication, and the advantage that students in live
classrooms have over their distance or remote counterparts.
First, regarding the "who," the performance or display in
subsection (1) must be made by instructors or pupils and
cannot be done by guest performers or students not enrolled in
the class. But the legislative history suggests that a guest
lecturer is covered by the exception and may perform or display
works consistent with the section's other conditions. 42
The major limitation that§ 110(1) does impose on educators
in "live" class settings is tied to the statutory language
requiring that qualifying performances and displays occur
within the context "of face-to-face teaching activities of a
nonprofit educational institution, in a classroom or similar
41. 17 U.S. C. § 110(1) (1995).
42. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 82 (Sept 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Gong.& Admin.
News 5659, 5696 (1995)) ("However, the term 'instructors' would be broad enough to
include guest lecturers if their instructional activities remain confined to classroom
activities. In general, the term 'pupils' refers to the enrolled members of a class.").
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place devoted to instruction." Remote broadcasts are not
allowed (but are covered by § 110 (2), but as long as the
instructor and pupil are in the same building or general area,
even though the performance might be "broadcast" via inhouse, closed-circuit television, the exemption applies. This
example allows for a transmission of material from one room to
another because all the students may not physically fit into the
same lecture hall to be covered by § 110(1), which is not the
true "distance" transmission contemplated by § 110(2). This
"where" requirement suggests that the §110(1) right is tied to
the traditional notion of the physical classroom versus the
wider school environment. For example, performance of a
copyrighted work at a school-wide assembly is not allowed
because this performance is not made in a classroom or similar
place devoted to instruction, although this situation might
conceivably be covered by § 110 (4). The 1976 legislative
history offers that the concept of face-to-face "embrace[s]
instructional performances and displays" as long as they are
not transmitted. However, the "concept does not require that
the teacher and the students be able to see each other,
although it does require their simultaneous presence in the
same general place."43 Same building or general area would
apply; for example, where a closed circuit transmission is used
to "beam" the class session from the main lecture room to
students gathered in adjoining or satellite rooms on other floors
in the same building and at the same time is permitted.
Finally, the "what" indicates that the§ 110(1) exemption to
the performance and display right of copyright owner's applies
to any type of work, be it text, audio, video, etc. This is one
instance where comparing the rights of educators in front of
live students (live face-to-face performances or displays under§
110(1)) versus educators in distance education settings
(performances or displays by means of a transmission under §
110(2)), the law favors the "use" rights of "live" teachers and
their students over those teachers and students in remote or
distance settings. This disparity is the main impetus behind
the legislative reform of§ 110(2) in TEACH. Under the current
law and as discussed above, transmissions of performances
under§ 110(2) are limited to nondramatic literary and musical
works. Thus, a teacher under pre-TEACH§ 110(2) could read a
text or sing a song but could not show a video (an audiovisual
43. !d. at 81.
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work) to distance students. That teacher's "live" instructional
counterpart, who teaches a similar course to an in-person, oncampus class and uses the same material, would face no such
limitation; the video tape (as long as it is a lawfully made copy)
could be shown to students gathered in a campus classroom.
This is the practical result of the broad grant of rights provided
to educators under § 110(1).
Consider a potential additional limitation on distance
educators. Recall that there is no performance right in a sound
recording and that the § 110(1) right applies to any category of
copyrighted material. Thus, in a 'live" class, a copyrighted
work like a sound recording (even in digital form, like a music
CD) could be performed, as that work has no "performance"
right associated with it. Also recall the amendment to § 106(6)
that created a performance right in digital audio transmissions
of sound recordings. Combine this fact with the reality that
arguably all transmissions of web-based distance instruction
would be digital, 44 and the distance classroom is again shortchanged in the pre-TEACH environment, and perhaps under
TEACH as well. Because § 110(1) applies to any category of
work, permissible performances include the playing of an LP or
music CD to a live class. Performance of the underlying
musical work is also covered because there is no limitation on
the category of works used. Nor does performance of the sound
recording necessitate any § 110(1) right, as the performance
right in a sound recording is only applicable when the
performance is made by means of a digital audio transmission.
However, in a distance education setting, the acceptable use
of the CD is far less clear and appears to be prohibited in the
pre-TEACH setting. At the very least, it has to qualify for the
complex licensing requirements under § 114(d): the use of
underlying musical work in the CD is allowed under § 110(2),
but the additional performance right under § 106(6) prevents
its use as a digital audio transmission over the Internet as part
of a web-based distance education course, as this would trigger
the performance right of the recording artist. Since the § 110(2)
right applies only to the underlying music and not to the
performer's copyright in the sound recording of it, a
performance right would now be needed to make digital audio
transmission to remote students over the Internet possible. Of
course, it could be argued that the creation of the performance
44. i.e., a digital transmission over the Internet
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right in a sound recording by means of a digital audio recording
is focused entirely on prohibiting the broadcast of sound
recordings as part of a pay-per-view equivalent of Internetbased or other digital variations of the celestialjukebox. 45
The general exceptions in § 114(d), exclude a
"nonsubscription broadcast transmission." Specific exceptions
exclude retransmissions of noncommercial educational
broadcast stations. 46 These provisions underscore the emphasis
of the new performance right on those uses of sound recordings
by digital modes that are more or less the equivalent of
digitized radio stations.
Furthermore, the definition of
"broadcast" under § 114(j) is tied to those broadcasts by
licensed Federal Communications Commissions authority.
Whether a court would also adopt this narrow view of the right
created is arguable as "the development of digital technology...
has blurred to distinction between broadcasting and
distribution."47 Under§ 114, a performance could be subject to
"no right at all, a statutory license, or a full exclusive right.'148
Nonsubscription broadcast transmissions are exempted by the
§ 106(6) performance right and statutory licenses are available
from subscriptions transmissions, but interactive service
transmissions are subject to the full exclusive right of§ 106(6).
Arguably, most distance education transmissions would be
subscription transmissions, as that concept is defined in §
114(j)(14), i.e., "controlled and limited to particular recipients"
and thus paid. So they could be subject to the statutory
licensing requirements of§ 114(d)(2)(C).
The "teaching activity" language in § 110(1) requires only
45. See Dralter, supra n. 3, at§ 2.04, at 2-14-2-28.15.
46. 17 U.S. C. § 114(d)(1)(B)(iv) (1995).
47. Harzard, supra n. 9 at 4-57 (citing in footnote 11, William H. O'Dowd, The
Need for a Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 31 Harv. J. on Legis. 249,
257 (1993)).
48. The Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education,
Sen. Hrg., 106-539, 106'" Cong., at 95-96 ("In its current form, section 114 divides the
types of transmissions that carry performances of sound recordings into three categories. Depending on the category into which the digital audio transmission falls, the
performance of the sound recording could be subject to no right at all, a statutory license, or a full exclusive right. The three categories of transmissions in section 114(d)
are: (1) nonsubscription broadcast transmissions (and certain retransmissions), which
are completely exempted from the section 106(6) performance right; (2) subscription
transmissions and certain 'eligible nonsubscription transmissions' such as web casting,
which are eligible for a statutory license, subject to a list of criteria; (3) interactive (ondemand) transmissions and other non-exempt transmissions that do not qualify for the
statutory license, which are subject to the full exclusive performance right.").
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that the content of the material be related to the curriculum.
Although showing the Hollywood film adaptation of "The Last
Temptation of Christ" is relevant in a theology class, it would
not be considered relevant if shown in a physics class as an
end-of-semester reward. Teaching activities do not include
performances or displays "whatever their cultural or
recreational value or intellectual appeal, that are given for the
recreation or entertainment of any part of their audience.'>~
Showing the same film to a theology class just to keep students
occupied while the teacher is absent or otherwise occupied
grading papers might not be acceptable, as the sense of
"curriculum" suggests that the material performed or displayed
must be integrated into the teaching session and coordinated
50
with a specific teaching moment.
Thus, showing "Saving
Private Ryan" during a unit on WWII without any other
integration into the curriculum might not qualify. Moreover, it
might be poor teaching, similar to a teacher bringing a helmet
or other equipment soldiers used in the Normandy landings
and just setting the items on the table without any other
explanation or commentary. However, showing the film and
then having students write a research paper comparing the
historical accuracy of the film to actual events or compose a
creative essay imagining what a particular a character from
the movie might include in a letter home would arguably offer
some integration of the film into the teaching or systematic
instructional activities.
Furthermore, the § 110(1) exemptions must be in a "bona
fide" educational environment with students enrolled in a
class. For example, showing a video to Spanish Club members
even in a classroom or school meeting room or to toddlers in a
9

49. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 81 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin.
News 5659, 5695 (1995)).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) ("performance or display of a work by instructors or pupils
in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational institution ..
."). (4 I-LR. Rpt. 94-1476, at 81 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin. News
5659, 5695 (1995)) observes that "[t]he 'teaching activities' exempted by the clause encompasses systematic instruction of a very wide variety of subjects ... " and H.R. Rpt.
94-1476, at 83 (Sept. 3, 1976)(reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin. News 5659, 5697
(1995)) discussing section 110(2) defines "ft]he concept of 'systematic instructional activities' is intended as the general equivalent of 'curriculums,' but it could be broader in
a case such as that of an institution using systematic teaching methods not related to
specific course work," but in no way does it extend to "performances or displays, whatever their cultural value or intellectual appeal, that are given for the recreation or entertainment of any part of their audience." H.R Rpt. 94-1476, at 81 (Sept. 3, 1976)(reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin. News 5659, 5695 (1995)).
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day care does not qualifY because the audience is not comprised
of students enrolled in a specific class. Showing a videocassette
in a classroom as part of a community travel night, parents'
organization, or school board meeting would not qualify
51
either.
Moreover, the educational institution must be
52
nonprofit. While it need not be accredited, this requirement is
added for distance education settings under TEACH, as
discussed below.
Finally, § 110(1) excepts performances and displays where
"in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, the
performance, or the display of individual images is given by
means of a copy that was not lawfully made under this title,
and that the person responsible for the performance knew or
had reason to believe was not lawfully made." Although not
targeted specifically at off-air tapings of programs recorded on
a VCR at home or at school then used in the classroom, this
language suggests that if, for instance, an off-air tape made
five years ago or from a pay-for-view station (and thus far in
excess of the 10-day viewing limitation for broadcast
programming contained in the off-air taping guidelines)53 was
shown, the§ 110(1) exemption would not apply to its use in the
classroom, since it is not a lawful copy. Most educators should
be aware ("knew or had reason to believe"54 ) that such use is far
beyond the acceptable realm of§ 110 and 107, thus it is a "copy
that was not lawfully made under this title." The "lawfully
made" requirement applies only to audiovisual works, not the
51. Although no court cases exist involving videocassette viewing, section 110,
and classrooms, analogous precedent supports this distinction. In Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1986); and Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984), the viewing of videos by customers in a video store, even where the viewing is done privately, was held to be a public
performance, because the store where the booths were located was public. On the other
hand, the viewing of videodiscs in a hotel room by guests is not a public performance
because hotel rooms, once rented for occupancy, are deemed private. Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc. v. Prof Real Est. Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989). In contrast, a
videotape system installed in hotel for remote operation by hotel guests for transmitting selected videotapes for viewing on TVs in hotel rooms is public performance requiring copyright license.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) ("performance or display of a work by instructors or pupils
in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational institution ..

.").
53. Guidelines for Off-Air Recording o{ Broadcast Programming for Educational
Purposes, reprinted in Reproduction of Copyrighted Works by Educators and Librari·
ans, Circular 21, U.S. Copy. Off. 26 (U.S. Copy. Off. 1988).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1)
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remaining categories of works allowed to be performed or
displayed under § 110(1).
A NEW DAY FOR DISTANCE EDUCATION: THE TEACH
REFORMULATION OF 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)
As discussed earlier, 55 pre-TEACH § 110(2) granted a
teacher performance and display rights of "transmission" when
using copyrighted works in nonprofit educational settings. The
transmission performance right, however, applied only to two
categories of works: nondramatic literary (text, such as a book
or poetry reading) or musical works (singing a song). § 110(2)
allows a faculty member to read from a Faulkner short story or
an excerpt from a Toni Morrison novel and stream (transmit)
the reading over the university's distance education technology.
But if the same faculty member desired to let his or her
distance students watch (load, stream, and view) a
documentary about Faulkner or a theatrical movie version of a
Morrison story, a performance right is needed. A performance
right is also required for the transmission of a play or "opera or
musical comedy or motion picture"56 since these are dramatic,
dramatico-musical, or audiovisual works. Such a drastic and
arbitrary difference in the application of an educator's ability to
use copyrighted material in live versus distance education
settings is one reason behind § 110(2) revision. Again, there
was no such limitation with respect to the display of works.
However, by definition of "display" and the nature of some
copyrighted works, the wide reach of the § 110(2) display right
can apply only to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works and
the text, score, or scripting of literary, musical, and
choreographic-pantomime works. 57
In contrast to these limitations, reform to § 110(2) by way of
its reformulation in TEACH accomplishes much. 58 According to
55. See supra n. 13 and the following discussion.
56. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 83 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Gong.& Admin.
News 5659, 5697 (1995)) ("Thus, the copyright owner's permission would be required
for the performance on educational television or radio of a dramatic work, of a
dramatico-musical work such as an opera or musical comedy, or of a motion picture.").
57. "[l]n the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of
a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly."
17 U.S.C. § 106(5); See also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (re: "display" lists); supra n.19.
58. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301.
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the Senate Committee Report on TEACH:
The Act expands the exempted copyright rights, the
types of transmissions, and the categories of works that
the exemption covers beyond those that are covered by
the existing exemption for performances and displays of
certain copyrighted works in the course of instructional
transmissions.
Thus,
for
example,
it
allows
transmissions to locations other than a physical
classroom, and allows for performances of reasonable
and limited portions of audiovisual works, sound
recordings, and other works within the scope of the
. 59
exemp t wn.
The goal of the § 110(2) revision is to "remove[] the concept
of the physical classroom."60 The reformulated TEACH version
of section 110(2) is long and somewhat complex (compared to §
110(1) and TEACH § 110(2)). Below is an analysis of its major
provisions.
First, TEASCH replaces the introductory applicable
"performance" and "display" statement of § 110(2) with broad
exclusory language regarding certain instructional material.
This may not be the most effective way to establish a positive
statutory tone of expanded user's rights. The prefatory clause
of TEACH § 110(2) accepts all works that are "produced or
marketed primarily for performance or display as part of
mediated instructional activities transmitted via digital
networks,"61 from the expanded performance and display right
of TEACH § 110(2). By its plain meaning the provision "limits
the relevant materials by excluding those primarily produced
or marketed for the exempt activity."62
Apparently this provision includes materials marketed
primarily for use in distance teaching, i.e., the exempt activity.
These materials are instructional by their intent, design, and
sale. While this may seem to be an odd result, (that materials
designed for use in the distance classroom are specifically
excluded from what might be characterized as an educational
rights provision), Congress was concerned that the expanded
ability to incorporate copyrighted material into the distance
59. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 4 (June 5, 2001).
60. I d. at 7.
61. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301.
62. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 10 (June 5, 2001).
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environment vis-a-vis a revised § 110(2) not be used to
supplant existing market or industry for instructional
materials. This limitation is "intended to prevent the
exemption [granted by TEACH] from undermining the primary
market for (and, therefore, impairing the incentive to create,
modifY, or distribute) those materials whose primary market
would otherwise fall within the scope of the exemption."63 Take
the example of textbooks as does the TEACH Committee
Report: "[B]ecause textbooks typically are not primarily
produced or marketed for performance or display in a manner
analogous to performances or display in the live classroom
setting, they would not per se be excluded from the exemption
under the exclusion in the opening clause."64 A teacher could, in
a distance education environment, display several pages of
graphs or charts from a textbook as the textbook is not
"produced primarily for performance or display as part of
mediated instructional activities."65 So, displays of textbooks,
or at least limited portions of a textbook, are allowed.
Second, the revised § 110(2) right would only apply to
"accredited" nonprofit educational institutions and not all
nonprofit educational institutions that might offer remote
instruction. 66 This is the first of several significant changes
from the pre-TEACH§ 110(2) requirements. Why the change?
The Senate Committee Report reiterates the Register's Report
that '"nonprofit educational institutions' are no longer a closed
and familiar group, and the ease with which anyone can
transmit educational material over the Internet" requires
placing some limitation on the type of entity that can avail
itself of the TEACH § 110(2) rights. 67 This would preclude a
small upstart non-profit school (for purposes of the tax laws, a
501(c)(3) entity for example) from qualifying, as it might not
63. !d. ai 8.
64. !d. at 10.
65. !d. ("Thus, an instructor would not be precluded from using a chart or table
or other short excerpt from a textbook different from the one assigned for the course, or
from emphasizing such an excerpt from the assigned textbooks that had been purchased by the students.").
66. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title Ill, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2) and new
definition of accreditation.
67. !d. at 9. This comment is underscored by a general prefatory observation by
the Committee that "the ability of digital transmission technologies to disseminate rapidly and without control virtually infinite numbers of high quality copies, creates new
risks for owners of copyrighted works used in distance education." Id., at 5.
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yet be accredited or might never be subject to accreditation.
The Senate Committee Report indicates that accreditation is
not defined in terms of programs, but in terms of institutions.
TEACH § 110(2) defines accreditation in two ways, depending
on whether the institution is elementary or secondary, or
whether it is post-secondary. For post-secondary institutions,
accreditation shall be determined by "a regional or national
accrediting agency recognized by the Council on Higher
Education Accreditation or the United States Department of
Education," and for purposes of K-12 institutions, it "shall be as
recognized by the applicable state certification or licensing
procedures. "68
Third, the new § 110(2) uses the term "mediated
instructional activities" to indicate that any use of material
must be "mediated." In other words, the material must be a
part of the normal teaching that would occur if the classes were
offered traditionally, and this requires that the material used
must be part of the class experience. This is the overall theme
of the reconstructed § 110(2) performance and display right, as
it was crafted to assuage fears of copyright owners. The concept
of mediated instructional activities encompasses three concepts
that might be coined: how ('"integral part' of a class session"),
who ("controlled by, under the direction of, or under the actual
supervision of the instructor"), and why ("analogous to the type
of performance or display that would take place in a live
classroom setting").
The qualifying performance or display of material "must be
part of the class itself, rather than ancillary to it."69 Further,
and again with idea of preventing distance education teachers
from placing excessive amounts of material on a course web
site because technology easily facilitates this conduct, the use
of the material must be "controlled by or under the actual
supervision of the instructor."70 But this "is not intended to
require either constant, real-time supervision by the instructor
or pre-approval by the instructor for the performance or
display ... and the concept of control and supervision is not
intended to limit the qualification of such asynchronous
68. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301 (new provision explaining the
meaning of "accreditation").
69. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 9 (June 5, 2001).
70. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301.
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activities for this exemption."71 Again, the overriding concern is
that use of materials in the distance education classroom be no
more extensive than that which would otherwise occur in the
traditional classroom.
In order to effect this scheme,
[t]his latter concept [mediated instructional activities] is
intended to require the performance or display to be
analogous to the type of performance or display that
would take place in a live classroom setting. Thus,
although it is possible to display an entire textbook or
extensive course-pack material through an e-book
reader or similar device or computer application, this
type of use of such materials as supplemental reading
would not be analogous to the type of display that would
take place in the classroom, and therefore would not be
authorized under the exemption. 72
In enacting TEACH Congress did not want the expanded
rights of educators in distance settings to be a carte blanche for
the inclusion of vast amounts of digital content into online
instructional settings. 73 If an instructor would not use the
material in a live classroom, he or she should not add it to the
online currjculum just because distance or other technology
renders it is easy to do, i.e., to scan, load, and post. The concept
of mediated instructional activities helps translate the notion
of the traditional concept of classroom to the digital online age,
and at the same time, it acts as a major limitation: making
sure that performance or display of copyrighted material in
online settings parallels or mirrors that of a live classrooms
environment.
The new statutory definition of mediated instructional
activities included in TEACH "does not refer to activities that
use, in one or more class sessions of a single course, such works
as textbooks, course packs, or other material in any media,
copies, or phonorecords which are typically purchased or
71. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 9 (June 5, 2001).
72. !d. at 9-10.
73. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301 (new section 112(f)(2) ("This
subsection does not authorize the conversion of print or other analog versions of works
into digital formats, except that such conversion is permitted hereunder, only with respect to the amount of such works authorized to be performed or displayed under section 110(2), if... "). Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14 (June 5, 2001) (" It should be emphasized
that subsection 112(f)(2) does not provide any authorization to convert print or other
analog versions of works into digital format except as permitted in section 112(f)(2)").
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acquired by the students in higher education for their
independent use and retention or are typically purchased or
acquired for elementary and secondary students for their
74
possession and independent use." The Senate Committee
Report echoes this concept and indicates that the definition
does not include "electronic course packs, e-reserves, and
digital library resources," as these sorts of materials are not
part of the analogous performance and display of materials
that typically occur in live instructional settings. 75 Again, the
goal is to have the use of copyrighted material in distance
environments mirror that which occurs in traditional
classrooms. So display of textbooks and similar material, even
if purchased in digital form, could not be used. It is assumed
that such display would be allowed if the institution or each
class member paid for each student's access to the digital
textbook.
The Senate Report recognized that digital distance
technologies could displace the need for textbooks, course
packs, etc., if such material could be loaded onto the distance
education course web site. However, in K-12 settings, textbooks
and the like are often not purchased by each student, as is
typical in higher education; rather, the school district obtains
the texts then distributes the items for use to each student at
the beginning of the school year. It is more proper to speak of
K-12 students as "acquiring" textbooks instead of "purchasing"
textbooks. The Senate Report was aware of this, and its
observation of that fact suggests that the revised § 110(2)
should not be used to require K-12 distance students to begin
purchasing textbooks if that was not the normal practice. 76
Again, the point is to ask what the normal practice is with
"live" students, and then mirror that in online settings. As a
result, a textbook is not per se excluded from the § 110(2)
TEACH performance and display right. 77 , Portions of a textbook
could be used, but only if it is either a supplemental textbook or
74. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301 (new provision explaining the
meaning of"mediated instructional activities").
75. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 10 (June 5, 2001).
76./d.
77. Id. ("Conversely, because textbooks typically are not primarily produced or
marketed for performance or display in a manner analogous to performances or display
in the live classroom setting, they would not per se he excluded form the exemption under the exclusion in the opening clause.").
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is a small portion of the main textbook, 78 otherwise it would be
would be excluded as its use would supplant the need for
purchase or acquisition of it by students. This might occur if
the textbook were loaded onto the distance education course
site, and made available for use without purchase or customary
rental fees paid to the copyright owner. Thus, the plain
language of the opening proviso of TEACH § 110(2) operates to
limit the use of an e-textbook or an e-workbook, as these are by
practical adoption in the distance classroom "transmitted via
digital networks" and their "primary market is the digital
network environment, not instructional materials developed
and marketed for use in the physical classroom."79
The internal structure of inclusion and exclusion within the
allowable§ 110(2) performances and displays is strange, as the
opening "except" clause of § 110(2) and the definition of
"mediated instructional activities" also identify material
excluded from its scope.
Moreover, the term "mediated
instructional activities" is also used twice, once in the opening
"except" clause of § 110(2) and again as part of the specific
requirements of§ 110(2). Section 110(2)(A) also uses the same
definition of "mediated instructional activities" that appears to
contradict or at least confuse the interpretation given to §
110(2) as a whole (attempting to limit online uses to those that
occur in a live class).
The opening clause of a revised § 110(2) applies to
performances or displays "except with respect to a work
produced or marketed primarily for performance or display as
part of mediated instructional activities transmitted via digital
networks." A later paragraph defining mediated instructional
activities (MIA) refers to the performance or display of a work
that is an integral part of the class experience, controlled or
under the supervision of the instructor, and analogous to the
type of performance or display that would take place in a live
classroom setting. However, according to the definition of MIA,
as discussed earlier, this does not include materials such as
textbooks, course packs, etc. So what does the opening proviso
of§ 110(2) also exclude from the expanded rights granted by
78. !d. ("Thus, an instructor would not be precluded from using a chart or table
or other short excerpt from a textbook different form the one assigned for the course, or
from emphasizing such an excerpt form the assigned textbook that had been purchased
by the students.").
79. Id. at 8.
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TEACH that the definition of MIA does not?
The legislative history suggests that TEACH ensures that §
110(2) is not used to replace the textbook thus it excludes such
works from the definition of "mediated instructional activities"
(MIA).
But TEACH also excludes works "produced or
marketed primarily for performance or display as part of
mediated instructional activities" from the performance and
display right§ 110(2) grants to educators. The opening proviso
exclusion reads: "except with respect to a work produced or
marketed primarily for performance or display ... "
One possible answer is that there are three categories of
works that are in theory acceptable for use in § 110(1) face-toface teaching two of which are excluded from the§ 110(2) uses
by its opening proviso and subsequent operational provisions.
These three categories include the following items: 1) NonMIA works like a textbook or course pack, excluded by the
subsequent TEACH statutory definition of MIA- educators
cannot use these works under § 110(2) because it would
supplant the need for purchase of such items by students; 2)
MIA works or other curricular materials that meet the
definition of MIA (integral part of class experience, under the
control of the instructor, and analogous) and can be used in
exercise of a § 110(2) activity, (an atlas for examplet 0 and 3)
80. The Senate Report suggests, "... because textbooks typically are not primarily
produced or marketed for performance or display in a manner analogous to performances or display in the live classroom setting, they would not per se be excluded from
the exemption under the exclusion in the opening clause. Thus, an instructor would
not be precluded from using a chart or table or other short excerpt from a textbook different from the one assigned for the course, or from emphasizing such an excerpt from
the assigned textbook that had been purchased by the students." Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at
10 (June 5, 2001). What is unfortunate about this exmnple is the failure to assess the
result if the instructor desired to use an entire text book other than the one assigned; it
can only be assumed that this would be excluded under the plain definition of MIA, but
by the same token the use of a "chart or table or other short excerpt from a textbook
different from the one assigned" one would expect to be a fair use, e.g., the reproduction
of such is allowed under the Classroom Guidelines, thus the comment adds or accomplishes little beyond what is already known of the copyright law and its application to
education. It would have been more helpful to indicate what is allowed under the concept of MIA vis-a-vis its definition but excluded by the "primarily" "produced or marketed" MIA phrasing in the opening "except"-ing clause. A more unsettling scenario
results when educators attempt to use the new TEACH section 112(D ephemeral recording right, discussed below, to digitize analog material for use in a digital distance
setting. The new digitalization right under section 112(D is tied to uses that are allowed under the reformulated TEACH section 110(2) right. If TEACH section 110(2)
does not allow its use, then TEACH section 112(D does not allow its ephemeral recording. So even if the use of the material would he a fair use under the copyright law,
no digitalization rights exists for it under TEACH section 112(f). One could of course
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MIA works "produced or marketed primarily for ... " the
distance classroom.
The last category might be a special multimedia product
designed for use in conjunction with distance education, as an
adjunct to a textbook, like the workbook of old, or this might be
some sort of digital tutorial or self-study aid designed for
students. The tutorial or self-study aid is not in a "textbook,
course packs or other material in any media" purchased or
acquired by students and so it is not excluded by the definition
of MIA. However, since in this case the item is produced or
marketed primarily for the distance education environment,
the work is excluded by the opening proviso of TEACH§ 110(2).
The fact that a digital product might be adaptable to the
distance education environment would not trigger the "except"
proviso of the opening clause, even if it were produced or
marketed with that adaptability. According to the plain
language of TEACH, the item must be "produced or marketed
81
primarily" for that purpose.
Where does that leave distance educators who have items
"produced or marketed primarily for performance or display as
part of mediated instructional activities," or, distance
educational instructional tools? These could not be subject to
the § 110(2) right by statute. In all likelihood, the use of these
products would be available to distance educators and their
students by license or under the terms of sale. If their purpose
is such that the works are "produced or marketed primarily for
performance or display as part of mediated instructional
activities transmitted via digital networks," can it
automatically be assumed that their use in the distance
classroom would be intended by their availability in the
educational marketplace as material "produce[d] and
market[ed] [ ] primarily for performance or display" for
distance teaching and as "mediated instructional activities
transmitted via digital networks" in the first place?
Perhaps TEACH prevents the use of such items in distance
education classrooms as a statutorily automatic right, i.e.,
through an expanded educator's right in § 110(2). Rather, it
argue that fair use not allows not only its performance or display, but also its reproduction (digitalization), but then again, in those circumstances what does TEACH add to
the law that is not already known.
81. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of" 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-2n, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301.
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forces educators to obtain the right to use materials in the
marketplace through purchase or license. For example, such
"distance education-targeted" MIA uses might be allowed
specifically by their purchase; otherwise, they would not be so
marketed. This, however, is a big "might." And if a license to
use the material in digital transmissions does not accompany
such acquisition, the material could not be used in distance
education. This is so because, while such items would not run
afoul of the definition of MIA, the opening exclusion proviso of
§ 110(2) would exclude their use. While these materials would
be excluded from the § 110(2) right, such materials might
conceivably remain available to teachers in live settings under
the existing § 110(1) where no such "produced or marketed
primarily for" exclusion proviso exists.
The purposeful use of a dual conceptualization of MIA
within the statutory structure is confirmed by Senate
Committee Repore 2 first as the initial ad seriatim
"requirements" proviso of § 110(2), i.e., §§ 110(2)(A)-(D); and
second, as discussed in preceding detail, in the opening section
110(2) excepting clause-each relating to a different function of
the term MIA. According to the Senate Committee Report; "the
former [§ 110(2)(A)] relates to the nature of the exempt activity
[teaching, and in the course of teaching using no more in
distance environs than in live classrooms]; the latter [opening
"except" proviso] limits the relevant materials by excluding
those primarily produced or marketed for the exempt
. "ty. ,83
ac t IVI
Fourth, the opening paragraph of TEACH § 110(2) includes
a provision that the work performed or displayed be a "lawfully
made" copy. There are two statutory elements in the lawfully
made copy test or requirement, one objective and the other
subjective. The objective element asks whether the item used
is a legitimate copy, as the § 110(2) performance or display
right does not apply when the "performance or display that is
given by means of a copy or phonorecord [ ] is not lawfully
made and acquired under this title." An institution that uses a
copy in violation of the anti-circumvention rules of 17 U.S.C.
82. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 7-9 (June 5, 2001) (discussing the opening "except" clause
regarding mediated instructional activities); Id. at 9-10 (discussing the operation of the
mediated instructional activities concept as part of the reformulated TEACH section
110(2)(A)).
83. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 10 (June 5, 2001) (emphasis added).
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1201(a), even if that use would be a fair use under§ 107, would
still be precluded from using it under TEACH § 110(2) as it
would not be "lawfully made and acquired under this title"
84
because it violates § 1201(a)(1) of title 17, United States Code.
The second subjective element looks to the institutional state of
mind, a sort of "distance education mens rea." This element
precludes performances and displays of works where "the
transmitting government body or accredited nonprofit
educational institution knew or had reason to believe [it] was
not lawfully made and acquired." A similar "knew or had
reason to believe" standard exists in § 110(1)85 and also in 17
U.S.C. § 504. 86 The latter concerns the remission of statutory
damages for infringement by nonprofit educational institutions
when there is a reasonable belief that the use was a fair use
under§ 107. 87 The purpose of the requirement "is to reduce the
likelihood that an exemption intended to cover only the
equivalent of traditional concepts of performance and display
would result in the proliferation or exploitation of unauthorized
copies."88
One difference between the current§ 110(1) (and the § 504
84. One example would be using a work that was circumvented by the school library or curriculum committee, and allowed under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (2002) for purposes of determining whether to purchase the item for the school library, the work once
accessed cannot be used for any other purpose, such as making it available to students
until the purchased copy arrives; even if the use would otherwise by allowed under the
copyright law, under fair use or section 1201, section 1201 forbids it. See Dralter, supra
n. 3, at§ 2.04, at 2-14-2-2 8.15
85. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (2002) ("is given by a means of a copy that was not lawfully
made under this title, and that the person responsible for the performance knew or had
reason to believe was not lawfully made.") (emphasis added).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 504 ("The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where
an infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of
the copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer was: (i) an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational institution, library, or archives acting within
the scope of his or her employment who, or such institution, library, or archives itself,
which infringed by reproducing the work in copies or phonorecords ... ") (emphasis
added).
87. 17 U.S. C.§ 504(c)(2).
88. Sen. Rpt.107-31, at 8 (June 5, 2001) (footnote to Register's Report omitted).
The Register's Report observes that the requirement would prevent educators from interference with the revenue stream owed copyright owners: "The educator would typically purchase the copy to be used, providing some revenue to the copyright owner. In
addition, works that had not yet been placed on the market, such as first-run movies,
would as a practical matter be rendered ineligible, mitigating further any possible impact on sales to the public." The Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education, Sen. Hrg., 106-539 U.S. Copy. Off. 160 (Corum. on the Jud. May 25,
1999).
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standard) and the TEACH § 110(2) standard is whose "mens
rea" is targeted. Section 110(1) places the inquiry at the
"person responsible for the performance," i.e., the educator or
student or guest lecturer, whereas TEACH § 110(2), on the
other hand, targets the institution. This shift might work to
increase the compliance responsibilities of the organization, a
shift which would be otherwise consistent with TEACH and
would limit the availability of the TEACH§ 110(2) right. Under
the institutional "mens rea" formulation of TEACH, if anyone
employed by or acting on behalf of the institution knew or
suspected the copy was not legitimate the "lawfully made"
proviso would be triggered and the item cannot be used.
Considering the copyright compliance issues that some
educational entities have encountered over the years, it might
be common to have "reason to believe" that a particular school
within the district or a certain university educator is using
copies of material in excess of the copyright law and thus, also
in excess of the § 110(2) right.
A second difference in the "lawfully made" requirement of
both TEACH and § 110(1) is that § 110(1) applies only "in the
case of a motion picture or audiovisual work, the performance,
or the display of individual images [from the audiovisual
work]," whereas TEACH § 110(2) applies to all works covered
by the expanded TEACH § 110(2) right (i.e., all categories of
copyrighted works). 89 The broader range of applicable works
(objective standard) coupled with the institutional emphasis
(subjective standard) imposes a higher degree of compliance
from the organization. Under§ 110(1), it could be argued that
a rogue educator, an educator with an overly simplistic
approach to the application of fair use, or a widely utilitarian
or rationalizing mindset, would not trip the "unlawfully made"
proviso, assuming arguendo that the educator's belief was
reasonable. Of course, the greater extent to which each
educator in the school understands the copyright law, the
smaller the realm of "knew or have reason to believe" instances
becomes. For example, many educators actually believe that
all educational uses of material in the classroom are fair under
the law. Many are so ignorant of the copyright law that they
reasonably conclude that all unlawful use is legal. Thus, these
educators arguably meet the requirement of§ 110(1).
89. ld. ("Unlike the provision in section 110(1), the exclusion here applies to the
performance or display of any work.").
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On the other hand, the TEACH § 110(2) "lawfully made"
proviso would clearly impute such behavior up the institutional
chain of command. No longer will a "what you don't know
won't hurt you attitude" offer refuge because someone along the
way might have a better idea of what is or is not a compliant
use. This process imposes a higher standard on educators and
schools. It at least operates to make it more likely that under
TEACH § 110(2), only those performances and displays that
incorporate lawfully made copies occur.
The standard, whether at the educator level(§ 110(1)) or at
the institutional level (TEACH § 110(2)) remains one of
reasonableness, not one of ignorance. Yet, unlike 17 U.S.C. §
504 where the reasonableness issue is directed towards asking
whether the use is fair, § 110(1) and TEACH direct the
reasonableness to the somewhat opposite issue of whether
there was any reason to suspect that the copy used came from
less than legitimate sources. 90 In other words, TEACH asks
educators, administrators, and staff whether any red flag exists
that suggests the copy might be an unlawfully made copy, as
opposed to whether it is reasonable to assume that the use was
lawful. This standard appears more generous to educators.
Educators do not have to prove in their minds that the use is
legitimate. They are precluded from using the copy only if the
copy is suspect.
However, it would appear reasonable
(especially in light of the press coverage regarding recent
copyright developments such as Napster, 91 the anti-trafficking
and anti-circumvention rules,n and the evolving standards of
90. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (2002) ("is given by a means of a copy that was not lawfully made under this title, and that the person responsible for the performance knew
or had reason to believe was not lawfully made.") (emphasis added). TEACH 110(2),
Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273,
116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301 ("except ... a performance or display that
is given by means of a copy or phonorecord that is not lawfully made and acquired under this title, and the transmitting government body or accredited nonprofit education
institution knew or had reason to believe was not lawfully made and acquired.") (emphasis added).
91. See e.f{. Metallica v. Napster Inc., No. 00-0391 (C.D. Cal. filed April 13, 2000).
92. See 17 U.S. C.§ 1201, and Universal City Studios v. Corely, 273 F.3d 429, 435
(2d Cir. 2001), the famous DeCSS DVD code-crack case begun when a Norwegian teenager, Jon Johansen, reverse-engineered and posted on the Internet the patch that allowed portability of DVDs; and U.S. u. Elcom Ltd., 203 F.Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal.
2002), a similar code-crack case involving Adobe e-book readers, first "cracked' by a
Russian software programmer Dmitry Sklyarov who was subsequently arrested upon
entering the United States to deliver a speech on encryption methods at a hacker conference. These and other cases involving section 1201 are discussed in John E. Ottaviani, DMCA Faces Free Speech Challenges, The Nat!. L. J., CL (Oct. 22, 2001)
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institutional liability)93 that a court or jury deciding the issue
would conclude that an educator or his or her institution might
legitimately have reason to believe that, under certain
circumstances, a copy might be derived from an unlawful
source.
Fifth, if TEACH is enacted by Congress, an important
limitation will still remain in the new formulation of the §
110(2) right. The limitation will be the uneven treatment of
various copyrighted works that might be performed or
displayed in the distance classroom. The TEACH § 110(2)
performance must be limited to a "nondramatic literary or
musical work or reasonable and limited portions of any other
work, or display of a work in an amount comparable to that
which is typically displayed in the course of a live classroom
session." Proposed § 110(2) expands the reach of the educator's
right to include the performance of other works such as a video,
a category of audiovisual work, but still limits performance of
that work to a reasonable and limited portion of works. While
an educator could show an entire video under § 110(1),
assuming the other requirements of§ 110(1) are satisfied, he or
she would be limited to a "reasonable and limited portion" of
the work in an online educational setting. To determine what
is a reasonable and limited portion one should consider "both
the nature of the market for that type of work and the
pedagogical purposes of the performance."94 Does an instructor
need to show an entire theatrical movie, such as "A Beautiful
Mind," in a History of Economics class, especially when the
film is still popular and the DVD version is yet to be released?
The extent to which a film relates to a course for pedagogical
reasons arguably lessens the extent to which the film is
"directly related and of material assistance to the teaching
95
content of the transmission. This goes to the pedagogical
purposes consideration. The showing of the entire film to the
class would impact the market for rentals or purchase of the
video or DVD edition by at least some of the students in the
class. This goes to the nature of the market consideration.
In summary, under the proposed formulation of TEACH §
93. See e.g., 17 U.S. C. § 512(e) (discussing the standards for liability reduction for
copyright infringement by the faculty and staff of institutions of higher education).
94. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 7-8. (June 5, 2001).
95. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, TEACH section 110(2)(B).
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110(2) there are three sorts of uses in the classroom with
different standards for each.
First, performances of
nondramatic and musical works, like the existing § 110(2)
right, can be used in distance settings without limit, assuming
the other requirements of TEACH § 110(2) are met. You can
read a text or sing a song without limit. Second, displays of
works are limited "an amount comparable to that which is
typically displayed in the course of a live classroom session."
You may scan and load an entire map or chart onto a course
website if that is what you would do for your live class. Third,
performances of works other than nondramatic or musical are
limited to a "reasonable and limited portion" of the work. The
Senate Committee Report discusses the first two groups of
works and the portion limitation associated with each, but
offers no elaboration on the third and limiting group, which
includes the significant category of audiovisual materials. For
example, only a "reasonable and limited portion" of a video can
be loaded onto a course web-site. The text of TEACH § 110(2)
and the Senate Committee Report save for the nature of the
market and pedagogical purpose "test" are silent with regards
to determining what that portion should be. Thus, either the
courts or interested stakeholders (through the adoption of
interpretive guidelines similar to those created under § 107),
will determine what percentage of video in this case would
constitute an acceptable safe harbor.
Sixth, the requirements of TEACH §§ 110(2)(A) (the
direction/supervision, integral part and MIA requirements) and
110(2)(B) (the "directly related and of material assistance")
were discussed earlier. The next substantive § 110(2)(C),
continues a recent Congressional trend and places an increased
compliance and monitoring burden upon institutions in return
for continued statutorily secured access to copyrighted material
in the classroom. 96
The compliance and monitoring
requirements are extensive and complex.
First, the transmission must be "solely for" "students
officially enrolled in the course for which the transmission is
made" while the "reception" of the qualifying transmission need
only be "to the extent technologically feasible," to "students
96. Tomas A. Lipinski, An Argument for the Application of Copyright Law to Distance Education, 13 Am. J. Distance Educ. 7 (1999). See also. The Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education, Sen. Hrg., 106-53 U.S. Copy. Off.
150-52 (Comm. on the Jud. May 25, 1999).
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officially enrolled in the course for which the transmission is
made." 97 Compare this formulation to the existing § 110(2),
which only requires the transmission be "primarily for"
students and that the reception be to "classrooms or similar
places." As discussed earlier, this means that under current
law as long as the performance or display is intended
"primarily" for "reception in classrooms or similar places," the
distance instruction is allowed. However, the transmission
must be tied to receipt by students in a bona fide physical
classroom. In fact, the 1976 House Report points out that "the
instructional transmission need only be made 'primarily' rather
98
than 'solely' to the specified recipients."
Under the proposed TEACH, however, the transmission
must now be solely for the specified recipients. TEACH cures a
major ill of§ 110(2), by specifying where the transmission can
be received. But, the bill may have created another problem by
the adoption of the words "solely" and "primarily," which are
logically more exclusive. Under TEACH, and in contrast to the
current§ 110(2) "primarily" formulation, any transmission that
is capable of reception by the public at large would be excluded.
Though the transmission might still be "primarily" for
reception of distance students, the transmission would no
longer be solely for distance students or students officially
enrolled in the course for which transmission is made. 99
97. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2)(C)(i).
98. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 83 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin.
News 5659, 5697 (1995)).
99. For example, a web course loaded available through an institution's open web
site, accessible to anyone would not appear to qualif'y: "In its place [referring to preTEACH section 110(2)(C)(i) "primarily for reception in classrooms or similar places
normally devoted to instruction" proviso], the Act substitutes the requirement in subparagraph (2)(C) that the transmission be made solely for, and to the extent technologically feasible, the reception is limited to students officially enrolled in the course for
which the transmission is made ... " The plain language of the statute direct the
transmission be "solely for" "students officially enrolled" and not everyone else on the
Internet who might also be interested. The use of closed-web site technology, i.e.,
password protection, is readily available ("technologically feasible") and would also
need to be employed with respect to its reception. This is underscored by the 1976 legislative history that drew a precise distinction between "primarily'' (1976 version of section 110(2)) and "solely" (the reformulated TEACH version of section 110(2)): H.R. Rpt.
94-1476, at 83 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Gong.& Admin. News 5659, 5697
(1995))("[T]he instructional transmission need only be made 'primarily' rather than
'solely' to the specified recipients."). This conscious choice of Congress must be acknowledged in its interpretation. One result of this is to make, generic education sites,
say one created for the purpose of teaching the web browsing public who might stumble
upon the site about copyright law unavailable for the TEACH section 110(2) right.
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However, if the transmission is made solely for distance
students, but results in others being able to access it (its
reception) because the password was somehow hacked the use
of the material (performance or display) would not be precluded
by TEACH § 110(2)(C). Performances and displays of works
made through educational broadcasts on a local access cable
network are now foreclosed by TEACH § 110(2)(C)(i). In
contrast, the place of reception is now expanded to focus on the
designation of a recipient as a student ("officially enrolled"
under TEACH § 110(2)(C)(i)), not his or her location ("reception
in classrooms or similar places normally devoted to instruction"
under current § 110(2)(C)(i)). The Senate Committee Report
offers limited breathing room, suggesting that the standard is
not absolute in its application:
This requirement is not intended to impose a general
requirement of network security. Rather, it is intended
to require only that the students or employees
authorized to be recipients of the transmission should
be identified, and the transmission should be
technologically limited to such identified authorized
recipients through systems such as password access or
100
other similar measures.
As a result, password protection is just one of the institutional
requirements imposed by TEACH. 101
Seventh, the institution must now take an active role in
promoting copyright compliance. Under TEACH§ 110(2)(D)(i),
the transmitting body or institution must institute copyright
policies; provide informational materials to faculty, staff, and
students about copyright law in the hopes of promoting
compliance; and provide notice to students that course material
may be subject to copyright protection. 102 Institutions can no
longer turn a blind eye to the extensive uploading,
downloading, and printing of course materials by educators and
While the concept of physical classroom might no longer exist under TEACH, the performance or display must still be used for an actual course of instruction, and not a
general educational purpose.
100. Sen. Rpt. 107-31,at 11.
101. Id. ("This requirement is not intended to impose a general requirement of
network security. Rather it is intended to require only that the students or employees
authorized to be recipients of the transmission should be identified, and the transmission should be technologically limited to such identified authorized recipients through
systems such as password access or other similar measures.").
102. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2)(D)(i).
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students in the course of a distance class or library e-reserve
scenario. Uploading, downloading, and printing that
administrators know occurs and which, at least in some
instances, is beyond the limits of the copyright law, must be
met with an institutional response from administrators. These
practices have become common but, now for the first time, the
law will require an institutional response such as the adoption
and arguably the enforcement of policies, promotions, and
notices. While it could be said that a mere notice requirement,
similar to the one that currently exists for reproducing
equipment in libraries under § 108/03 does not necessarily
require enforcement by the library-institution, TEACH will
require more. TEACH also commands that "policies regarding
copyright" be adopted; and if copyright compliance becomes
part of the formal institutional governance structure vis-a-vis
policy formulation then the normal governance structure of
most institutions would also require compliance with and
enforcement of those polices by and as applied to its
constituents.
Moreover,
the
TEACH
§
110(2)(D)(i)
requirements are not limited to policies and information
outreach about copyright issues concerning distance education,
as there is no such limiting language in the bill. Rather the
policies, promotions, and notice commands appear to refer to
copyright issues in general, such as those that might occur in
general educational settings, not just those specific to distance
education. However, because TEACH § 110(2)(D)(i) use the
phrase "the course" when discussing the "notice to students
that materials used in connection with" proviso, it could be
argued that the course material notice requirement only apply
to § 110(2) courses, i.e., distance education courses, whether
analog or digital. 104The purpose of these requirements is to
"promote an environment of compliance with the law, inform
recipients of their responsibilities under copyright law, and
decrease the likelihood of unintentional and uninformed acts of
infringement." 105 This is a significant advance in the struggle
to bring schools and other educational entities into copyright
103. 37 C.F.R. § 201.14 (warnings of copyright for use by certain libraries and archives).
104. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2)(D)(i),
("provides notice to students that materials used in connection with the course may be
subject to copyright protection" (emphasis added)).
105. Sen. Rpt. 107-31,at 11.
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compliance.
Institutions will have to plan, adopt, and
implement a copyright compliance program that includes
copyright policies and organizational development programs
that seek to inform students and staff of copyright law
requirements and responsibilities. These are issues not
necessarily associated with distance education alone, but a
wide array of copyright issues. Institutions will have to have
warning notices that course materials may be subject to
copyright law. The notices could be perhaps modeled after
those already in use for photocopiers. 106 Placement could be in
student handbooks, as a preface to course syllabi, or as part of
a distance education course web site log-on screen or home
page. While the TEACH revision to § 110(2) does not require
the institution to provide training and in-service sessions, it
does require extensive documentation of policies and
informational material to be developed for teachers, students,
and staff. 107 There is no requirement that the institution make
any assessment of whether faculty, students, and staff have a
basic level of understanding of the material so developed and
distributed in order to see whether its compliance efforts are
effective. However, it would appear that such training and
assessment components should be part of any effective
copyright compliance program. One would assume, or perhaps
hope, that known breaches of any copyright policy so adopted
would be dealt with by the institution as would similar
violations of its policies regarding other issues. In addition to §
110(2)(D)(i), TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii) expands the monitoring
and compliance activities of educational institutions when the
transmission is digital-applying to web-based distance
education transmissions-to require the use of technological
measures that "reasonably prevent" both the "retention of the
work in accessible form . . . for longer than the class session"
and the "unauthorized further dissemination of the work in
accessible form to others." 108 In other words, a school could use
106. See 17 U.S. C. § 108(0(1) & 37 C.F.R at§ 201.14 (warnings of copyright for
use by certain libraries and archives).
107. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2)(D)(i) ("institutes polices regarding copyright, provides informational materials to faculty, students, and relevant staff members that accurately describe, and promote compliance
with, the laws of the United States relating to copyright ... ").
108. The retention provision is new TEACH 110(2)(D)(ii)(I)(aa), and the dissemination provision is found in 110(2)(D)(ii)(I)(bb).
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the display privilege in TEACH § 110(2) to mount related
background material or record class sessions for later review
that include the display of copyrighted material. But schools
could not allow students the capacity to retain the work on
their own computer or allow students to download the material
109
and later upload and transmit it to others in accessible form.
The technological measures need not be one hundred percent
effective, but must operate to "reasonably prevent" both the
110
prohibited retention and further dissemination of the work.
Hopefully, scenarios where a student circumvents or cracks a
password control system, or the protection technology fails due
to technical problems with the institution's server, the
institution still meets the "reasonably prevent[s]" requirement
of§ 110(2)(D)(ii)(l). However, the institution must then respond
with tools within its means to rectify the situation. The
discussion in the House Report (noticeably absent from the
Senate Report) suggests that periodic review or reevaluation is
necessary: "Further, it is possible that, as times passes, a
technological protection measure may cease to reasonably
prevent retention of the work in accessible form for longer than
the class session and further dissemination of the work either
due to the evolution of technology or to the widespread
availability of a hack that can be readily used by the public."111
The House Report indicates this is an "objectively reasonable
standard regarding the ability of a technology protection
measure to achieve its purpose." 112 It does not have to work
perfectly and prevent each and every retention and
dissemination, but the technology protection measure must do
something and by the language of the statute must do it
"reasonably" well. 113 The House Report offers this observation:
"Examples of technological protection measures that exist
today and would reasonably prevent retention and further
dissemination, include measures used in connection with
109. See Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section
110(2)(D)(ii)(I)(aa) and (bb) (requiring institution to use "technological measures that
reasonably prevent" the retention and further dissemination of the work in accessible
form, respectively).
110. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2)(D)(ii)(l).
111. H. Rpt. No. 107-687, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002).
112. H. Rpt. No. 107-687, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002).
113. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2)(D)(ii)(I).
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streaming to prevent the copying of streamed material, such as
the Real Player 'Secret Handshake/Copy Switch' technology
discussed in Real Networks u. Streambox, 2000 WL 127311
[Real Networks, Inc. u. Streambox, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1889 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (preliminary injunction)], or digital
rights management systems that limit access to or use
encrypted material downloaded onto a computer." 114
In addition, under TEACH 110(2)(D)(ii)(II), the institution
may not engage in any conduct that "could reasonably be
expected to interfere" with any technological measure a
copyright owner places on his/her works to prevent either
retention or unauthorized further dissemination. 115 This might
mean that an institution could not obtain material for use in a
distance class that was limited by a technological block, such as
one that limits the number of aggregate access and downloads
of the material per semester, then create and post a patch of
code or software script that would allow students to exceed that
number of downloads.
As another example, consider a
situation where the authorized downloading is subject to
temporal limits by the terms of a license agreement governing
use of the material, and the system facilitates subsequent
downloading by students after the course ends by continuing to
make the legitimate digital key available on the institution's
web site. 116 This would appear to be "conduct that could
reasonably be expected to interfere with technological
measures used by copyright owners to prevent such retention
or unauthorized further dissemination." 117
The TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(II) "technological measures"
prohibition is effective regardless of whether the posting would
be lawful under the anti-circumvention or anti-trafficking rules
of section 1201. 118 Allowing retention of the work in accessible
114. H. Rpt. No. 107-687, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002).
115. Technolof?y, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2)(D)(ii)(Il)
("does not engage in conduct that could reasonably be expected to interfere with technological measures used by copyright owners to prevent such retention or unauthorized
further dissemination").
116. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 12 ("On the other hand, an encrypted file would still be
considered to be in 'accessible form' if the body or institution provides the recipient
with a key for use beyond the class session").
117. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2)(D)(ii)(II).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 1201. A thorough discussion of the section 1201 anticircumvention rules in found in Dralter, supra n. 3. "[L]ike the other provisions under
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form might be akin to a circumvention of an access device
under § 1201(a)(1) and allowing further dissemination of the
work in accessible form might akin to a trafficking of an access
or use device under §§ 1201(a)(1) and (b), respectively.
Arguably, the posting of the hacked patch code script in the
first example in the preceding paragraph would be a §
1201(a)(2) violation, as it is a dissemination or trafficking of a
circumventing access technology by allowing the continued
availability of the legitimate digital key even though the time
limitation is in violation of the license agreement. 119 Because
TEACH fails to define what the "conduct that could reasonably
be expected to interfere with technological measures used by
copyright owners to prevent such retention or unauthorized
further dissemination " are, there may be misalignment with
the § 1201(a) anti-circumvention or anti-trafficking rules. 120 In
other words, not all TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(I) interferences are
necessarily violations of the section 1201 anti-circumvention or
anti-trafficking rules. The section 1201 anti-trafficking rules
target dissemination of prohibited access and use
technologies. 121 On the other hand, it would appear that the
trafficking to students of any such section 1201 circumvention
technologies would by the plain language of TEACH §
110(2)(D)(ii)(II) also be "conduct that could reasonably be
expected to interfere with technological measures used by
copyright owners to prevent such retention or unauthorized
further dissemination."122 Thus, it could be concluded that all
section 1201 violations, if performed by the educational
institution, would also be TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(Il)
violations. 123
TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(Il) states that the institution may
"not engage in conduct that could reasonably be expected to
interfere with technological measures" used by copyright
paragraph (2)(D)(ii), the requirement [the interference provision of (ii)(ll)] has no legal
effect other than as a condition of eligibility for the exemption. Thus it is not otherwise
enforceable to preclude or prohibit conduct." H. Rpt. No. 107-687, 107th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (2002).
119. See Universal City Studios u. Corely, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
120. 17 U.S. C. § 1201, discussion at footnotes 114 and 115.
121. See Dralter, supra n. 3, at§ 2.04, at§ 2.05, at 2-28.16-2-48.1.
122. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, H3301, new section 110(2)(D)(ii)(II).
123. 17 U.S.C. § 1201; Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act
o{2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section
110(2)(D)(ii)(IJ); discussion supra at ns. 114 and 115.
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owners to prevent further retention or dissemination as
discussed above. "[L]ike the other provisions under paragraph
(2)(D)(ii), the requirement [the interference provision of (ii)(II)]
has no legal effect other than as a condition of eligibility for the
exemption. Thus it is not otherwise enforceable to preclude or
124
prohibit conduct." However, such interference might indeed
violate the anti-circumvention rule or precede a violation of the
anti-trafficking rules of 17 U.S.C. § 1201 as well as foreclose
the application of TEACH. By the same token, it also means
that institutional "interfere[nce]" with a "technological
[protection] measure" need not rise to a level meeting the
requirements ofthe § 1201 rules for that interference to render
inapplicable the exemption granted by TEACH 110(2).
In an even more anomalous result, section 1203, the
penalty provision of the anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking
rules, indicates that under 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(5)(A), the "court
may in its discretion reduce or remit the total award of
damages in any case in which the violator sustains the burden
of proving, and the court finds, that the violator was not aware
and had no had reason to believe that its act constituted a
12
violation." " For qualifying nonprofit entities, the court must
remit all damages under 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(5)(B):
In the case of a nonprofit library, archives, educational
institution, or public broadcasting entity, the court shall
remit damages in any case in which the library, archives, educational institution, or public broadcasting
entity sustains the burden of proving, and the courts
fins, that the library, archive, educational institution, or
public broadcasting entity was not aware and had no
126
reason to believe that it acts constituted a violation."
Glaring in its absence is a similar 'know or reason to know'
proviso in TEACH. In other words, a qualifying entity could
engage in a violation of the anti-circumvention rule of § 1201,
"not !be] aware and ha[ve] no reason to believe that it acts
constituted a violation" and as a result have no monetary
liability under the § 1201(c)(5) rule but loose its exemption
under TEACH as it nonetheless interfered with a technological
measures used by the copyright owner to prevent such
retention or further dissemination.
124. H. Rpt. No. 107-687. 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002).
125. 17 U.S. C. ~ 1203(c)(5)(A)
126. 17 U.S.C. ~ 1203(c)(5)(B).
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However, it might also not violate the § 1201 rules without
any need of the damage remission rules but still cause an
"interference with the technological measures" that triggers the
loss of the TEACH exemption (unless of course TEACH views
an 110(2)(D)(ii)(II) interference and § 1201 circumvention as
the same act, i.e., the legal parameters if each coincide exactly,
but there is no indication of that intention in either statute or
the legislative history of TEACH. In fact, the opposite
conclusion-that a TEACH 110(2)(D)(ii)(Il) act of interference
is not the same as § 1201 circumvention or trafficking-is
supported by the TEACH legislative history. For example, the
legislative history as quoted earlier suggests that an act of
interference under TEACH is not a separate violation,
therefore it can be argued that a TEACH interference is not the
same as a § 1201 circumvention, but merely a qualifying
precursor to exemption under § 110(2), thus a misalignment
between TEACH qualification and § 1201 anti-circumvention
127
and trafficking occurs.
While the "no longer than the class session" language would
seem to impose rather harsh temporal limitation on the
accessibility of distance education course content, the Senate
Committee Report offers an extensive discussion of the §
11 0(2)(D )(ii)(l)(aa)
retention -beyond -class-session
proviso,
which somewhat tempers this impression. 12 R For example, in
distance education environments, the normal class session is
not necessarily tied to a specific time period, such as Mondays
and Wednesdays from 10 a.m. to 11 a.m. Yet TEACH uses the
rather limiting "no longer than the class session" language.
How does TEACH reconcile this restriction with the twenty129
four-seven construct of contemporary distance education?
The Senate Committee Report redefines the concept of "class
session." For asynchronous distance education this would be
the time period during which the student is logged onto the
server. For the distance student of today and tomorrow, this
could be two minutes, two hours, or even two days! While the
acceptable "class session" could be longer than the actual
synchronous class period, according to the Senate Committee
Report, "class session" is still shorter than the duration of the

127. See supra n. 114 for discussion.
128. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 11-12.
129. !d. at 4 ("and at times selected by the students").
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entire course. ·
As a result, the Senate Report suggests
flexibility in allowing material to remain posted on the
institution server throughout the duration of a course, beyond
the confines of a synchronous "class session." The Senate
Report redirects the compliant use of "technological measures
that reasonably prevent" retention or further dissemination to
other conduct such as "encrypting the work and limiting access
to the keys and the period in which such file may be accessed."
131
This is a progressive concept of availability. However,
according to the Senate Report, it is "expect[ed] that a common
sense construction will be applied so that a copy or phonorecord
displayed or performed in the course of a distance education
program would not remain in the possession of the recipient in
a way that could substitute for acquisition or for uses other
132
than use in the particular class session."
Apparently,
continued access to material for some period less than the
duration of the course is acceptable because it is not a
substitute for acquisition. How is "substitute for acquisition"
viewed in TEACH?
Is it a redefined concept as well?
Apparently so, as the interpretation given to it by the Senate
Report couples the acceptable retention concept to both
temporal limits and placement limits.D~ This suggests that
scenarios where students are permitted to download and store
personal copies of class materials on their computers in
accessible form beyond the duration of the course or for some
other period less than the duration of the course and longer
than is necessary "to complete the class session," but for which
the Senate Report offers no other guidance, would be
prohibited.
The technological protection measure must
l:JO. !d. at 12 ("The duration of a 'class session' in asynchronous distance education would generally be that period during which a student is logged on to the server of
the institution or governmental body making the display or performance, but is likely
to vary with the needs of the student and with the design of the particular course. It
does not mean the duration of a particular course (i.e., a semester or term), but rather
is intended to describe the equivalent of an actual single face-to-face mediated class
session (although it may be asynchronous and one student may remain online or retain
access to the performance or display for longer than another student as needed to complete the class session).").

l;H.ld.
132.Jd.
133. ld. (emphasis added). Temporal limits refer to the expanded notion of the
"no longer than the class session" language, a redefined notion of class session in order
"to accomplish the pedago[,rical goals of distance education." Placement limits or "the
technological protection measure in subparagraph (2)(D)(ii) refers only to retention of a
copy or phonorecord in the computer of the recipient of a transmission."
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reasonably prevent such retentions. However, both the
retention and dissemination prohibition clauses of TEACH §
110(2)(D)(ii)(I) only prohibit retentions and disseminations "in
accessible form." As explained below, an encrypted version of a
work kept beyond these temporal and placement limits (e.g.,
beyond the class session and in the computer of the student
would not be "in accessible form.)"
Failing to use technological measures that prevents a
student from transferring the downloaded material "in
accessible form" to another student, even within the acceptable
time limits, would also be prohibited under TEACH. This is so
because the dissemination proviso contains no such temporal
tie-in. 134
However, a student who transfers without
authorization an encrypted version, one not in accessible form,
would not. Moreover, a student who prints out a hard copy of
the work and either keeps it or gives it to another does not
engage in a prohibited retention, even though by logic it might
function as a substitute for acquisition. This is so because the
TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii) prohibition targets only those retentions
and disseminations in "accessible form." 135
While the
"accessible form" retention proviso could include the download
and store instance where the digital version is retained (on a
separate diskette), the legislative history places emphasis only
upon retentions in accessible form that are stored "in the
computer of the recipient." 136 While it might nonetheless
appear that the student has retained or acquired a copy of the
work when he or she prints it out or has disseminated it when
the print out is given to another person, it is not a violation of
the TEACH retention or dissemination provision. Is this
logical? Perhaps not, but it is consistent with the statutory
134. Compare Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section
110(2)(D)(ii)(I)(aa) ("retention of the work in accessible form by recipients of the transmission from the transmitting body or institution for longer than the class session")
with new section 110(2)(D)(ii)(I)(bb) ("unauthorized further dissemination of the work
in accessible form by such recipients to others").
135. Compare Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section
110(2)(D)(ii)(I)(aa) ("retention of the work in accessible form by recipients of the transmission from the transmitting body or institution for longer than the class session")
with new section 110(2)(D)(ii)(l)(bb) ("unauthorized further dissemination of the work
in accessible form by such recipients to others").
136. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 12 ("Conversely, the technological protection measure in
subparagraph (2)(D)(ii) refers only to retention of a copy or phonorecord in the computer of the recipient of a transmission.").
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language that couples prohibited retentions or disseminations
only to those that are in "accessible form," 137 and then ties that
form for retentions to those that "reside in the computer of the
recipient of a transmission." 138 Why is a copy or phonorecord of
a digital work in accessible treated different, why is digital
different? Because in the words of the Senate Report, The
digital transmission of works to students poses greater risks to
copyright owners than transmissions through analog
broadcasts. Digital technologies make possible the creation of
multiple copies, and their rapid and widespread dissemination
around the world." 139 Because a hard copy or printed version is
not in "accessible form," it does not count as a retention or
dissemination. 14 u Further, the only digital retention that
counts is one that resides on the computer of the recipient of
the transmission! The technological protection measure must
be designed to fulfill these nuances. Thus, the only prohibited
retention is a digital copy residing on the computer of the
student-recipient, and the only prohibited dissemination to a
third party is of a digital copy, either of which cannot be in
accessible, readable or useable form. In theory, this allows for
digital retention not on the computer of the recipient. How this
limited use-after-download or retention on the computer or
dissemination of digital copy to others is to be technologically
accomplished is unclear. For example, placing students on an
honor system to purge their computers of a work downloaded
and stored after the course ends, expecting class members to
uphold a promise not to transmit a digital copy of the work
received during the time needed to complete the class session,
or having class members promise not to upload a copy retained
on a diskette or data CD-ROM after the class has ended and
transfer it to another over the Internet seems unrealistic.
137. See Technology, Education. and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section
ll0(2)(D)(ii)(l)(aa) ("retention of the work in accessible form by recipients of the transmission from the transmitting body or institution for longer than the class session")
with new section 110(2)(D)(ii)(l)(bb) ("unauthorized further dissemination of the work
in accessible form by such recipients to others").
138. See Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 12 ("Conversely, the technological protection measure in subparagraph (2)(D)(ii) refers only to retention of a copy or phonorecord in the
computer of the recipient of a transmission.").
139. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 11.
140. !d. at 12 ("Conversely, the technological protection measure in subparagraph (2)(D)(ii) refers only to retention of a copy or phonorecord in the computer of the
recipient of a transmission.").

146

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2003

Perhaps some sort of digital time bomb, such as an automatic
degradation of the digital copy, might be encoded into the work
so after the duration of the course, the work is no longer
available on the student's computer. The use of a digital key
that prevents dissemination to another Internet address or
intranet location would accomplish the same task. Simpler
encryption technology can also be employed. According to
TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(l), some sort of "technological measures
that reasonably prevent" these retentions and disseminations
would have to be adopted. Since printing out the material is
not contemplated by TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(l), for example, the
technological control measure would not need to prevent that
action to meet the requirements of TEACH.
Further, does the "retention of the work in accessible form"
language refer to any digital format as opposed to non-digital
formats, or does it refer to a narrower group of digital forms
residing "in the computer of the recipient of a transmission"
141
versus a digital copy located elsewhere?
If the latter
happens, then a technological protection measure that allows a
student to download the work onto his or her computer and
retain a readable copy there beyond the duration of the course
would not be in compliance with TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(l)(aa).
However, if the institution's technological measure allowed
another student to download the work onto a diskette or data
CD-ROM, retain the digital and readable copy indefinitely, it
would still be in compliance, as long as the initial diskette or
CD-ROM download was made during the duration of the class
session. 142 It would appear that, while retaining a digital form
accessible from a diskette would not run afoul of the Senate
Committee Report language per se, but that unencrypted
accessible form could never be the source of a subsequent
dissemination
as
the
TEACH
§
110(2)(D)(ii)(l)(bb)
141. Id.
142. The Senate Committee Report suggests that TEACH was not meant to preclude anything beyond retention: "The reference to 'accessible form' recognizes that certain technological protection measures that could be used to comply with subparagraph
(d)(D)(ii) do not cause the destruction or prevent the making of a digital file; rather
they work by encrypting the work and limiting access to the keys and the period in
which such file may be accessed." Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 12. In other words a student
should not have access to material from the third class in last and fifteenth week but
could during week three "mak]e] a digital file" and assumingly print out the material
as well, or retain a digital file but could allow it to reside on his or her hard drive but
would need it to be on a diskette, however, the student could not do this after the fif~
teen weeks of the course have concluded.
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dissemination proviso only uses the "accessible form" phrasing.
This suggests a lack of any temporal limitation whatsoever. In
other words, all digital disseminations in accessible form must
be reasonably prevented by the technological measure, and
must be prohibited regardless of location, whether on the
student's computer, diskette, CD-ROM, or some other
technological medium. 11 :1 How would the institution accomplish
this, not needing to worry about accessible retentions of the
work not in the computer of the recipient but needing to
prevent all further accessible disseminations? Arguably this
query places great emphasis on a reading of the legislative
144
history's interpretation of the retention clause, but it might
suggest the use of both encrypting technology to protect against
accessible forms beyond the temporal limitation, e.g., a timebased digital key, and additional technology that prevents a
computer other than the recipient-student's from receiving and
accessing the work, a "further dissemination of the work in
accessible form by such recipients to others."
The concept of "retention of the work in accessible form"
then appears more synonymous with the concept of digital
"access" by students of course content during the term of the
145
course.
It might have been simpler to place a statutory
restriction within TEACH against any downloading
whatsoever, making it the equivalent of a "view only" provision.
Arguably, this was the intent of the proposal considering the
"would not remain in the possession of the recipient in a way
that could substitute for acquisition or for uses other than use
in the particular class session" Senate Report language. 14 " But,
143. /d., at 12 ("Conversely, the technological protection measure in subparagraph (2)(D)(ii) refers only to retention of a copy or phonorecord in the computer o{ the
rccr:pient of a transmtssion."). The Senate Report uses the phrase "refers on to retention" and not "rders to retention and dissemination", the plain language of TEACH,
new section 1] 0(2)(D)(ii)(l)(bb), requires the technological measure to reasonably prevent "unauthorized further dissemination of the work in accessible {orrn by such recipients to others". Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. l07-27:i, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301.
144. /d. at 12 ("Conversely, the technological protection measure in subparagraph (2)(D)(ii) refers only to retention of a copy or phonorecord in the computer of the
recipient of a transmission.").
14fi. !d. ("The reference to 'accessible form' recognizes that certain technological
protection measures that could be used to comply with subparagraph (d)(D)(ii) do not
cause the destruction or prevent the making of a digital file; rather they work by encrypting the work and limiting access to the keys and the period in which such file may
be accessed.").
14G. !d. ("ITlhe Committee expects that a common sense construction will be ap-
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as explained above, this approach is contradicted and relaxed
somewhat by the statutory phrasing of TEACH and other
supporting legislative history commentary that limits the
concept of retention only to a narrow category of those works
that are in "accessible form" (in the computer of the recipient)
and for a period no "longer than the class session" as that
concept is defined in the legislative history. 147
However, from a copyright owner's perspective, the Senate
Report concept of "retention," expressed as concern for
materials that "remain in the possession of the recipient in a
way that could substitute for acquisition," remains problematic
as there are ways in which this might be accomplished short of
making the work available in an accessible form beyond the
duration of the course. Further, it is this sort of retention
possession by students that continues to bother copyright
owners. Suppose access to a portion of course content is given
only to those students who pay the equivalent of a digital
"materials fee." Consider the student who pays the digital
materials fee, accesses the digital version from the institution's
server during the allowable course period, proceeds to print out
a copy of the work, and thus obtains a copy of the work in a
non-digital form or gives the resulting printed copy of the
material to another student taking the course in a following
semester. In this instance, the student retains a copy in his or
her possession that would appear to be a prohibited "substitute
for acquisition" in the legislative history phrasing. 148 In the
second instance, the student has disseminated the document to
another, again a prohibited "use[] other than use in the
149
particular class session."
Does this violate TEACH §
110(2)(D)(ii)(I)?
Has an impermissible retention or
dissemination occurred?
While printing off a copy of a work would surely seem to
qualify as a "substitute for acquisition," this is an acceptable
retention since it is not a retention of the work "in accessible
form" rather it is a retention in another form. 150 Does this short
plied so that a copy or phonorecord displayed or performed in the course of a distance
education program would not remain in the possession of the recipient in a way that
could sub~titute for acquisition or for uses other than use in the particular class session").
147. ld. at 11-12.
148. ld. at 12.
149. !d. at 12.
150. ld. at 12
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change the copyright owner? While it could be argued that this
result contradicts the spirit of the "remain in the possession of
the recipient in a way that could substitute for acquisition"
prohibition of the Senate Report language, this "acceptable"
retention language might, in reality, apply to a small portion of
the curricular material. An example of this might be the
equivalent of what an instructor might display or copy and
151
hand out in live class.
In other words, under TEACH,
distance education web sites should not contain entire
copyrighted works of this sort (textbooks, electronic course
packs, e-reserves, and digital library resources) because
TEACH does not authorize the use these works under its
provisions. The retention and dissemination provisions both
use the phrase "the work" not any (copyrighted) work, and
suggest the technological measures need only protect TEACH
authorized works (performance of a nondramitc literary or
musical work, reasonable and limited portions of other works
performed, and the display of works in an amount comparable
to that which is typically displayed in the course of a live
152
classroom session ), not other works that might loaded onto
the course or library website through license agreement or by
appeal to some other provision of the copyright law such as fair
use. Arguably a critical reading of the use of a preposition.
Though Congress could have used the phrasing "retention of
the work in any form" or dissemination of any work in
accessible form: but it did not. Thus the restricted reading is
arguable. As a result, when all is said and done, the amount of
material that the reformulated TEACH § 110(2) performance
and display right applies to is rather a small amount of
material that might conceivably be loaded onto a distance
education course web site. 153 Thus, allowing students to retain
151. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act o{ 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2) ("or display of a work in an amount comparable to that which is typically displayed in the
course of a live classroom session"). "The 'limited portion' formulation used in conjunction with the performance right is not used to [sic] connection with the display right
exemption, because for certain works, display of the entire work could be appropriate
and consistent with displays typically made in a live classroom setting (e.g., short poems or essays, or images of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, etc)'' Sen. Rpt. 10731, at 8.
152. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2).
153. Id. (Displays are limited to the "amount comparable to that which is typically displayed in the course of a live classroom session.") Yet, it is likely thnt many
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a copy of this material in a non-accessible form is acceptable.
It is also supported by Senate Report language that places
concern on "retention of a copy or phonorecord in the computer
154
of the recipient of a transmission" beyond the duration of the
155
course, and not on other retentions such as printing out a
hard copy.
However, instead of coupling the concept of
retention to form and time, it would have been simpler to
merely state what sort of retentions, if any, is acceptable. The
same rationale would apply to the issue of whether a
technological measure that fails to prohibit such dissemination
meets the standard established by TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii) and
is thus prohibited as dissemination is linked only to those in
accessible form. In other words, the technological measure
must only reasonably prevent disseminations in digital form.
EPHEMERAL RECORDINGS: INTERMEDIATE REPRODUCTION AS A
PRECURSOR TO ONLINE INSTRUCTION

A final substantive section of TEACH amends the
"Ephemeral Recordings" provisions of § 112 by adding a new
subsection (f) to cover digital transmissions. 156 This adjustment
is necessary because the task of readying the copyright law to
facilitate distance education in the electronic age would be
incomplete if TEACH addressed the revision of§ 110(2) alone
and left the issue of intermediate copying untouched. In the
days of "distance education as broadcast," when an instructor
course web sites contain a fair amount of additional reading material or at least are
linked to that material from the course web site, linked to the institution's library ereserve, and as discussed earlier "electronic course packs, e-reserves, and digital library resources," are not part of the TEACH section 110(2) performance and display
right. !d. at 10.
154. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 12 ("Conversely, the technological protection measure in
subparagraph (2)(D)(ii) refers only to retention of a copy or phonorecord in the computer of the recipient of a transmission.").
155. !d. ("The reference to 'accessible form' recognizes that certain technological
protection measures that could be used to comply with subparagraph (d)(D)(ii) do not
cause the destruction or prevent the making of a digital file; rather they work by encrypting the work and limiting access to the keys and the period in which such file may
be accessed."(emphasis added)). This language would appear to allow for downloading
with retention limited to the duration of the course or for the printing out of the material (a non-digital copy). On the other hand it might merely mean that not all compliant technological measures need "cause the destruction or prevent the making of a
digital file."
156. Technolo{;y, Education, and Copyri&ht Harmonization Act of' 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 112(f).
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would bring a work into the classroom and perform or display
it, the transmission of that teaching, whether by broadcast or
transmission over traditional airways, did not require that an
intermediate copy of the work be made.
Rather, a
"transmission copy" was made when the display was captured
by use of the recording-broadcast technology. However, in the
new age of distance education with its array of teaching tools,
an instructor will be more likely to record and synchronize his
or her voice over a series of digitized images such as maps,
charts, or an article. Perhaps these can be incorporated into a
Power Point or web-based presentation, or at least made into
digital versions that can be available to students as separate
resources.
TEACH makes it clear that copies made previous to a valid
reformulated § 110(2) performance or display would not be an
157
infringement of the owner's exclusive right.
It is not an
infringement "to transmit a work that is in digital form and,
solely to the extent permitted in paragraph (2) [referring to
subparagraph (2) of 112(f), as amended, i.e., what would be a
new 112(f)(2)], of a work that is in analog form, embodying the
performance or display to be used from making transmissions
authorized under § 110(2)."158 In other words, the new §
112(f)(1) governs the copying-transmission of digital works, and
the new section 112([)(2) governs the copying-transmission of
all other works such as those in analog form, which must first
159
be converted to digital form before a transmission can occur.
According to the Senate Report, "[u]nder new subsection
112([)(1), transmitting organizations authorized to transmit
performances or displays under section 110(2) may load on
their servers copies or phonorecords of the performance or
display authorized to be transmitted under section 110(2) to be
160
used for making such transmissions."
However, several
caveats exist.
First, under revised paragraph 112(f)(l)(A)
governing digital works, the § 112(f) right applies only if "such
copies or phonorecords are retained and used solely by the body
or institution that made them, and no further copies or
phonorecords are produced from them, except as authorized

157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
ld.
Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 12 & 14.
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161

under section 110(2)."
Does this mean the institution must
ensure that students do not make downstream copies? Not
necessarily, as long as the institution otherwise complies with
the § 110(2) requirement to impose technological controls
where feasible to "reasonably prevent" retention or
unauthorized further dissemination, the previous discussion of
162
exactly what is meant by "retention" notwithstanding.
However, what this language does suggest is that the
governmental body or institution could not share a copy made
with another entity, such as by transferring a file of
supplemental materials it took the time to collect and load as
part of a distance course to another school district for use in a
related course in its distance program. The "used solely by"
language would prohibit this transfer. 163 Nor could the school
make a copy of the materials after the course ends and allow a
fellow faculty member to use it in designing his or her own
distance education class, as this would violate the "no further
164
copies or phonorecords are reproduced from them" proviso.
The institution could allow the copies to remain on its server
("retained and used solely by the body or institution that made
165
166
them" ) for use in a subsequent semester.
The "further
copies or phonorecords" that are allowed, are limited to those
"authorized by section 110(2)." This would included the
authorized retention in accessible by a student in accordance
with TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(I) discussed earlier.
In addition, under TEACH § 112(D(1)(B), the copies or
phonorecords must be "used solely for transmissions authorized
under § 110(2)." 167 For example, the body or institution could
not make a second digital copy for use in its own library as part
161. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 112(f)(1 )(A).
162. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, ~13301, new section
110(2)(D)(ii)(l)(aa).
163. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 112(D(1)(A).
164. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of'2002. I d.
165. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002. !d.
166. "Under new subsection 112(f)(1), transmitting organizations authorized to
transmit performances or displays under section 110(2) may load on their servers copIes or phonorecords of the performance or display authorized to be transmitted under
section 110(2) to be used for making such transmissions." Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 12 & 14.
167. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, ~13301, new section 112(D(l)(A).
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of an e-reserve for on-site or campus-based students, even if
such use or distribution might be authorized under §§ 107 (fair
use) or 108(c) (governing additional reproduction and
distribution rights for qualifying nonprofit libraries and
archives) or by a license agreement. While this additional use
on campus would not necessarily violate TEACH § 112(f)(l)(A)
which is the "used solely by" the institution that made them
provision, it does violate the TEACH § 112(f)(l)(B) "solely" for§
110(2) purposes proviso. 168
Under TEACH, an amended § 112 does not provide
institutions with a carte blanche ability to create digital
libraries for use in remote educational settings: "It should be
emphasized that subsection 112(f)(2) does not provide any
authorization to convert print or other analog versions of works
into digital format except as permitted in section 112(f)(2)."169
However, if under revised 110(2) an instructor would show a
map in class, for example, he/she would need to have a loaded
"digital" copy of that map available on the course web site for
distance students who might access the class content twentyfour-seven. TEACH § 112 allows the copy of this material onto
the institution's server and to remain there for access by
students. 170
Under a more narrow reading, it could be argued that all
that is allowed is the "ephemeral recording" of the instructor
holding up the map while recording his lecture for the course
web-site. However, this is in fact the major limitation of the
current ephemeral recording provision, § 112(b). 171 "However, it
[existing section 112(b)] would not authorize the making of
transient reproduction necessary to the technical process of
transmission in online courses ... "172 Title 17 United States
16fl. Technolo{{y, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title lii, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 112(D(1)(A) and
(B).

169. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14.
170. Id. ("In order for asynchronous distance education to proceed, organizations
providing distance education transmissions must be able to load material that will be
displayed or performed on their servers, for transmission at the request of students.").
But TEACH 1 12(f)(l) and (2) both make clear that the ephemeral recording always underlies a TEACH 110(2) use of the work. See Technology, Education, and Copyright
Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C,
~ 1:1301, new section 112(f)(l) and (2).
171. 17 U.S. C. § 112(b).
172. The Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education;
Sen Hrg. 106-539, 106'" Cong., at 95.
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Code, section 112, enacted as part of the 1976 Act, allowed an
ephemeral recording to be made during "live" broadcasts and
transmitted to classes. 173 The remote nature of the educational
experience required that a copy of the initial broadcast be sent
to students who did not receive it because of an illness, a
scheduling conflict, or a technical malfunction. 174 Subject to
certain limits, this section allowed the transmitting entity to
keep a copy of the transmission for archival purposes, and
other copies (up to thirty copies total) were destroyed within
seven years. 175
The U.S. Copyright Office Report and TEACH make a fine
distinction between performances and displays and the copying
that must necessarily occur as part of a distance education
scenario, either before or along with that performance or
display. While there might not be much difference to educators
between the scan or post and its performance or display, this
transparency is still not contemplated by the new law.
According to the U.S. Copyright Office Report, even its
recommended "amended version of § 110(2) in itself would not
permit the reproduction necessary for an educator to post the
work to be performed or displayed to the course site, for later
access by students." 176 Thus, an amendment of 17 U.S.C. § 112
is also needed. 177 "Accordingly, we [the U.S. Copyright Office]
recommend adding a new subsection to section 112 that would
permit an educator to upload a copyrighted work onto a server,
to be subsequently transmitted under the conditions set out in
§ 110(2) to students enrolled in her course." 178 As a result, if the
"posting" is made as a precursor to a bona fide TEACH§ 110(2)
performance or display, then its maintenance on the school
server until a distance student accesses the material
(triggering a new transmission of the posting) is an allowable
ephemeral recording under TEACH § 112(f). 179
173.17U.S.C. § 112(b)(2).
174. This is one use of the 1976 ephemeral recording right in 112(b).
175. 17 U.S. C. § 112(b)(2).
176. The Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education:
Sen. Hrg. 106-539, 106th Cong., at 160.
177. Attention to this need was made by those testifying at the field hearings
held by the Register of Copyrights throughout the early months of 1999, see, e.g., Testimony of Tomas A. Lipinski (Additional Discussion), in id. at 138-39.
178. !d. at 161.
179. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14 ("Under new subsection 112(0(1), transmitting organizations authorized to transmit performances or displays under section 110(2) may
load on their servers copies or phonorecords of the performance or display authorized to
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Secondly, TEACH § 112(D(l)(B) requires that "such copies
or phonorecords [bej used solely for transmissions authorized
under section 110(2)."180 This repeats the concluding clause of
TEACH § 112(f)(l): "embodying the performance or display to
be used from making transmissions authorized under §
110(2)."181 Is this superfluous? If not, under TEACH §
112(f)(l), the "embodying the performance or display to be used
from making transmissions authorized under § 110(2)"
language requires that the initial motivation for making
ephemeral recording ("to make copies or phonorecords") be
182
dependant upon a bona fide § 110(2) activity.
Similar
TEACH § 112(f)(l)(B) language, which says, "such copies or
phonorecords are used solely for transmissions authorized
under § 110(2)," suggests that the subsequent transmission of
the copy be for § 110(2) purposes. 183 In other words, there is a
dual TEACH § 110(2) "purpose" requirement in the new
TEACH ephemeral recording right: one related to the reason
for making initial "copies or phonorecords" (TEACH §
112(f)(l)), and the second related to the actual use of those
"copies or phonorecords" (TEACH § 112(f)(l)(B)) in the
184
subsequent transmission.
Once the initial copies of
phonorecords are made for a TEACH § 110(2) purpose, the
copies of phonorecords can only be used for Title 17 U.S.C. §
ISS
110 ( 2 ) purposes. ·
Third, TEACH § 112(f) "requires the use of works that are

be transmitted under section 110(2) to be used for the making such transmissions.").
180. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. §
112(D(l)(B).
181. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act o/'2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. §
112(0(1).
182. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of'2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. §
112(0(1).
183. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act o/'2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-2n, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S. C. §
112(f)(1)(A).
184. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act o/'2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S C. §
112(11(1) and (f)(l)(A).
185. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act o/'2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. §
112(fl(l)(B).
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already in digital form," 186 so that the availability of digital
copies of works does not proliferate and cause them to be used
in infringing ways. However, some works may not be available
in digital form, and so TEACH § (f)(2) was created to govern
the limited use (copying) of works when no digital format is
187
available.
However, this digitization right is limited and is
not to be equated with a general safe harbor right to digitize
188
material for use in educational pursuits. A non-digital work
can be digitized for use in distance education scenarios under
TEACH § 112(f)(2) when either "no digital version of the work
is available to the institution" (a limitation imposed by TEACH
§ 112(f)(2)(A)), or the "digital version of the work that is
available to the institution is subject to technological protection
measures that prevent its use for section 110(2)" (the limitation
of TEACH § 112(f)(2)(B)). 189
Even under either of these
circumstances, wholesale digitization is not permitted. 190
Rather, digitization is permissible "only with respect to the
amount of such works authorized to be performed or displayed
under § 110(2)." This restriction is found in the introductory
paragraph of TEACH § 112(f)(2). 191
Under either of the above circumstances, digitization of the
work can only be for the portion of the work that is authorized
by TEACH § 110(2). 192 The opening paragraph of TEACH §
110(2) contains three "limitation" directives: first, there IS no
186. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14.
187. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of"2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, § 13301, creating new 17 U.S C. §
112(!)(2).
188. TEACH section 112(D(2) contains the following opening proviso: "ltlhis subsection does not authorize the conversion of print or other analog versions of works into
digital formats, except ... " See also, Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14 ("It should be emphasized
that subsection 112(f)(2) does not provide any authorization to convert print or other
analog versions of works into digital format except as permitted in section 112([)(2).").
189. Techn.olo!{y, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act o/2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-27:3, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. §
112(D(2)
190. TEACH section 112([)(2) contains the following opening proviso: "[t]his subsection does not authorize the conversion of print or other analog versions of works into
digital formats, except ... " See also, Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14 ("It should be emphasized
that subsf~ction 112([)(2) does not provide any authorization to convert print or other
analog versions of works into digital format except as permitted in section 112(D(2).").
191. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of"2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S. C. §
112(D(2).
192. /d. ("only with respect to the amount of such works authorized to be performed or displayed under section 110(2)").
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digitization limitation on the portion of a nondramatic literary
or musical work that is performed; secondly, for works other
than nondramatic or musical works that are performed, the
portion of the work that can be digitized is limited to a
"reasonable and limited portion" of the work; and thirdly, for
works that are displayed, the portion of the work that can be
digitized is limited to the amount that would be used in a live
face-to-face teaching encounter.m This allowable digitization
portion might then translate in practice to be a cassette
recording of a Bernstein song (no limitation), a clip from a 16
mm movie (reasonable and limited portion), or a textbook page
containing a chart, table, or graph (an amount comparable to
that which is typically displayed in the course of live classroom
session).
Because of TEACH § 110(2), TEACH § 112(f)(2) may give
educators the ability to "ignore" the "performance" right to a
musical work, i.e., the underlying score of the Bernstein piece,
but not the performance right to copy it for later performance
via distance education web technology. 194 In general, there is
195
no performance right in sound recordings.
In the days of
analog recordings and traditional broadcasts, this absence of a
performance right in sound recordings posed no problem to
distance educators, so the category of copyrighted works under
17 U.S.C. § 110(2) did not need to be enlarged. 196 However,
since then, Congress expanded copyright owners' "exclusive"
rights to include a performance right in a sound recording
when performed by means of a "digital audio transmission." 197
Once a work is digitized and transmitted over the Internet
through distance education delivery technology, a digital audio
transmission has occurred, which triggers the § 106(6)
performance right for digital audio transmissions of sound
19
recordings. R According to the previous discussion, if this
"performance right" applies to works digitized under TEACH
112(f)(2), then TEACH § 110(2) grants a right to ignore a
19:~. Tcchnolo!{y, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-27:1, llG Stat. 1758, Title HI, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. §
110(2).
194. See Hazard, supra n. 9, at 4-54 ("Separate and distinct from the musical
copyright in the song, there is a copyright in the recorded performance of that song").
195. 17 U.S.C. ~ 106(G).
196. l'rc-TEACJI 17 U.S.C. ~ 110(2).
197. See 17U.S.C. ~ 106(6).
HJR. ld.
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copyright owner's performance right in the musical work, but
not to ignore the performance right in the sound recording of
the musical work, or at least as far as TEACH § 110(2) is
concerned only the "reasonable and limited portions of any
other work" that is performed. 199 As a result, a separate
performance right still needs to be obtained from the copyright
owner of the sound recording to convert the entire cassette
recording of the Bernstein song to a digital format and then
transmit is over the Internet in a distance education class. 200 In
summary, digitalization can occur under TEACH § 112(f)(2)
199. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act o{2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. §
110(2).
200. TEACH section 112(D(2) would not allow for the digitization of the Bernstein song in its entirety. While there is no problem with respect to the performance
right associated with the use of musical work, i.e., the underlying song, as TEACH section 110(2) contains no such portion limitation on this category of work performedassuming of course that the other requirements of TEACH section 112CD(2) are met (no
digital version available or if available it is subject to technological protection measures. There is, however, is a problem with respect to the sound recording, i.e., the "performance" of the musical work captured in a sound recording (in and of itself a derivative work and thus a "work" subject to copyright protection) by Arthur Fiedler and the
Boston Pops, the New York Philharmonic, etc., and the right to perform it by means of
digital audio transmission. The performance right belongs to whoever owns the copyright in the performance (sound recording) of the work-the recording artist, the record
company, or some other entity. Under TEACH section 112CD(2), commands to limit the
ephemeral recording (digitization) arc those which would be authorized under TEACH
section 110(2). The amount able to be digitized would thus be limited to a "reasonable
and limited portion" of the work, as the only two categories that can be performed in
their entirety under TEACH section 110(2) are nondramatic literary and musical
works. The right to transmit under TEACH section 112(0(2) is limited to "the amount
of such works authorized to be performed or displayed under section 110(2)." Under
TEACH section 110(2) for sound recordings-works other than "nondramatic literary
or musical works"-this amount is limited to a "reasonable and limited portion" of the
work.
While there is no discussion of this point in the legislative history, the plain language of TEACH section 112(D(2) does not suggest any other result than the following.
Because the analog cassette recording consists of two categories of copyrighted works-musical and sound recording-which are each limited by a different TEACH section
110(2) amount-the more restrictive limitation must apply. Digitization is limited to
the "conversion of the portion or amount of such works that are authorized to be performed or displayed under section 110(2)" (Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14), and since one cannot separate the two rights associated with the embodiment of the work in the cassette
recording-a "musical" work and a "sound recording"-the amount that could be digitized in the first instance under TEACH section 112(f)(2) is limited to a "reasonable
and limited portion" of the work. If this is not the result that Congress intended, then
TEACH section 110(2) should be amended to include the performance right of a sound
recording by means of digital audio transmission in otherwise qualifying educational
scenarios (Under Title 17, United States Code, section 110(2)). This could be accomplished by expanding the "nondramatic literary and musical work" clause of TEACH
section 110(2) to include sound recordings by digital audio transmissions.
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assuming the requirements of TEACH § 112(f)(2) are met, or a
digital copy of a digital version of the work can made. In either
case, that portion that may be used in limited to the amount
authorized by TEACH§ 110(2). With the Bernstein recording,
there are two copyrights in it so to speak, the musical work (the
underlying music) and the sound recording of it. TEACH §
110(2) states that the performance of musical works, digital or
otherwise is unlimited, i.e., there is no limiting language in
TEACH § 110(2). As to the performance of the sound recording
(the playing of the recording), when the distance education
transmission is analog, no further right of the copyright owner
is implicated, as there is no performance in a sound recording.
However, when the playing of the recording is via a digital
transmission a performance right does indeed exist and
TEACH § 110(2) must be consulted. That section states that
the performance of works other than "nondramatic literary or
musical works" is limited to "reasonable and limited portions
of' the work and so a performance right would be needed for
that portion of the work beyond the "reasonable and limited
portions of' the work that TEACH§ 110(2) does grant the right
to use.
Finally, the use of the phrase "available to" in both TEACH
§§ 112(f)(2)(A) and (B) is not the same as saying "purchased,"
"licensed," or "in the possession of' the institution. Arguably,
the existence of a digital version of the work "available to" the
institution could occur in any number of ways beyond actual
ownership or possession. Thus, if the work is somehow
available by purchase or through interlibrary loan, an
institution cannot digitize an analog copy. 201 Instead, it has to
obtain an "available" digital copy through purchase or license
or loan, and it has to use TEACH § 112(f)(l) to authorize its
ephemeral copying (such as uploading onto the distance
education course web site). 202 It must also employ TEACH §
110(2) to authorize its transmission to distance education
scenarios. 203 Furthermore, if Congress desired to anchor the
"available to" clause to mean ownership or possession alone or
201. Technology, Education, and
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III,
112(0(2).
202. !d.
20:~. Technology, Education, and
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III,
110(2).

Copyright Harmonization Act oj'2002, Pub. L.
Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. ~

Copyright Harmonization Act oj'2002, Pub. L.
Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. §
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otherwise physically in the hands of the institution and not a
general marketplace or access availability it could have easily
done so as it did in section 108 regarding the copying, including
digitalization, that qualifying libraries and archives can make
of unpublished and published works. 204 This process
underscores the need for sale or license agreements governing
digital material that an educational institution might
specifically use in distance environments to allow for these
ephemeral recording rights. A license agreement forbidding
such use would override any rights granted by TEACH. 205 If
"available" means something more than actual possession, but
is more equated with access to the work vis-a-vis the
marketplace for example, then this would suggest that in
situations where the institution desires to digitize a work for
use in an otherwise qualifying distance education transmission,
several steps must be taken. First, a check must be made to
determine if a digital version is available, if so it must
purchase it instead of converting its analog copy. However, if
the institution determines that the digital copy of the work
that is available for purchase it comes with technological
protection measures, the institution does not have to purchase
a copy first in order for the digital version of the work to be
available to it. This is so because "available to" as discussed
above does not mean purchase or otherwise in the collection. 206
204. Section 108(b) states that "[t]he rights of reproduction and distribution under this section apply to three copies or phonorecords of an unpublished work duplicated solely for purposes of preservation and security or for deposit for research use in
another library or archives of the type described by Clause (2) of subsection (a), if-(1)
the copy or phonorecord reproduced is currently in the collections of the library or archives; and (2) any such copy or phonorecord that is reproduced in digital format is not
otherwise distributed in that format and is not made available to the public in that
format outside the premises of the library or archives." 17 U.S.C. 108(b) (emphasis
added). Section 108(c) contains a similar "the copy or phonorecord reproduced is currently in the collections of the library or archives" provision.
205. See ProCD u. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
206. Of course the contrary argument is that if Congress had desired a "marketplace tes" to be made, it could have made that an express command in TEACH section
112(D(2), as it did in section 108 regarding the copying, including digitalization, that
qualifying libraries and archives can make of unpublished and published works. Section lOS(c) states that "[tjhe right of reproduction under this section applies to three
copies or phonorecords of a published work duplicated solely for the purpose of replacement of a copy or phonorecord that is damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen, or if
the existing format in which the work is stored has become obsolete, if-(1) the library
or archives has, after a reasonable effort, determined that an unused replacement cannot be obtained at a fair price; and (2) any such copy or phonorecord that is reproduced
in digital format is not made available to the public in that format outside the premises
of the library or archives in lawful possession of such copy." 17 U.S.C. 108(c) (emphasis
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In other words, the technological protection requirement of §
112(f)(2)(B) is triggered, i.e., without having to purchase a copy
of it first. 207
Three scenarios appear under TEACH § 112(f). First, the
work may be only available in analog form, in which case
digitization is allowed because it meets the explicit
requirement of TEACH§ 112(f)(2)(A) (conversion allowed when
208
no digital version is available).
Secondly, the work may or
may not be available in analog form, but it is definitely
available in digital form, in which case digitization is also
prohibited by TEACH § 112(f)(2)(A). 209 Thirdly, the digital
version of the work may be "subject to technological protection
measures that prevent its use for § 110(2)," in which case
digitization is allowed by TEACH § 112(f)(2)(B). 210
The
technological protection measure need not be designed
specifically to prevent distance education transmission, it just
211
must prevent use for a TEACH § 110(2) purpose. This poses
an odd series of choices for the copyright owner.
A copyright owner who chooses not to release a version of
his/her work in digital form faces possible digitization of the
analog version by a qualifying educational institution under
TEACH§§ 112(f) and 110(2), which are the ephemeral copying
and distance transmission provisions. 212 Justifiably, the grant
of the conversion ability (analog to digital) to support distance
teaching is consistent with the underlying purpose of
added).
207. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of'2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. §
112(0(2)(B).
208. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-27:3, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. §
112(0(2)(A), assuming the use is for an authorized TEACH section 110(2) performance
or display.
209. !d.
210. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14. ("In those circumstances where no digital version is
available to the institution or the digital version that is available is subject to technological measures that prevent its use for distance education under the exemption, section 112(f)(2) authorizes the conversion from an analog version ... ").
211. !d. ("However, the Committee recognizes that some works may not be available for use in distance education, either because no digital version of the work is
available to the institution, or because available digital versions are subject to technological protection measures that prevent their use for the performances and displays
authorized by section 110(2)").
212. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. §
112(f)(2)(A).
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TEACH.m However, a copyright owner who does decide to
offer a digital version of her work in the marketplace in
addition to an analog one is at least protected from further
digitization of the existing analog copies by TEACH §
112(f)(2)(A). 214 As a practical result, the law forces educational
institutions to either purchase, license, or otherwise obtain and
use a digital version of these works. 215 This assumes of course
that "available to the institution" is interpreted to mean a
general availability, in the marketplace, for example. This at
least offers some possibility that the copyright owner will
benefit from additional royalties from sale or license fee of the
copyrighted work. 216 On the other hand, a copyright owner who
places a technological protection measure on the digital version
of her work because she fears exploitation in the distance
education environment is specifically thwarted by TEACH §
112(f)(2)(B) because digitization of an analog copy is then
specifically authorized. 217 Thus, the best a copyright owner who
does not want her works used in distance education scenarios
can do is either make sure no analog copies exist (most likely
an impossibility), or offer a digital version in the marketplace
but not one that is encrypted or contains some other
technological protection to preclude conversion to digital form
and hope to generate revenues when educational institutions
buy it initially. 218 A copyright owner who, out of fear of
exploitation or abuse, places digital protective measures on his
work actually promotes further digitization of existing analog
copies.~
Thus, the concept behind technological preventative
19

213. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14 (touting the ability of learners to access digital
transmission asynchronously).
214. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. §
112(D(2)(A).
215. ld.
216. Since availability forecloses digitalization under TEACH 112(D(2), a copy of
the work will likely first need to be purchased or licensed before its ephemeral copying
(loading onto the institution's distance education server) can occur under TEACH section 112(D(1).
217. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. §
112(f)(2)(B).
218. If it exists in digital form but a technological protection exists on it, then
digitalization of extant analog copies is allowed under id.
219. This is so because Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act
of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new
17 U.S. C. § 112(f)(2)(B) authorized digitization of analog copies when the "digital ver-
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use measures appears to be defeated.
However, if a copyright owner fails to use a technological
protection measure, his work will become easily available for
illegal copyright exploitation in other non-17 U.S.C. § 110(2)
22
environments. ° For some copyright owners, this choice is
difficult. If the owner uses a technological protection measure
to protect against excessive (in a practical sense) or unfair (in a
legal sense) uses, he will not have recourse in TEACH
scenarios (through the TEACH § 112(f)(2)(B) conversion
221
right).
If the owner chooses not to use a technological
protection measure to make a digital version available in the
market, he will be making an exploitable version available (the
work is unprotected by technological measures against illegal
222
uses).
Doing this might be especially undesirable for
copyright owners whose primary market is education. If their
works are left unprotected by technological protection
measures, they may face widespread abuse in other
scenarios. 22 :1 This may also work to force copyright owners to
employ mechanisms such as license by which the terms and
conditions of use can restrict the TEACH grant of use or secure
through the license negotiation an adequate revenue stream for
the performance or display and ephemeral recording that does
occur.
224
TEACH is a complex and convoluted amendment to the
sian that is available to the institution is subject to technological protection measures."
220. See e.g Universal City Studios, Inc. u. Corley, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25330
(2d Cir. 2001) (circumvention of DVD technological protection measure); U.S. u. Elcom
Ltd., 203 F.Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (circumvention of e-book technological protection measure).
221. This is so because Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act
oj'2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new
17 U.S.C. § 112(D(2)(B) authorized digitization of analog copies when the "digital version that is available to the institution is subject to technological protection measures."
222. See for example US. u. Elcom Ltd., 203 F.Supp., 2d 1111, 1132 (N.D. Cal.
2002). ("However, it is already unlawful to infringe, yet piracy of intellectual property
has reached epidemic proportions."). See also Victoria Slind-Flor, Students Plunk IP
Rights 101, The Natl. L .•T. B6 (Mar. 13, 2000)
223. Green, D. W. (1993), Copyright Law and Policy Meet the Curriculum: Teachers' Understanding, Attitudes, and Practices, ERIC Doc. # ED 364 946 (1993); R.L.
Rice, Behavior Opinions and Perceptions of Alabama Public School Teachers and Principals Regarding the Unauthorized Copying and Use of Microcomputer Software, ERIC
Doc.# ED 340 703 (1991).
224. A final related section of TEACH requires the PTO, within six months of enactment, to report public comment about the technical!industry standards available for
protecting "digitized copyrighted works." This is the Congress' consistent trend for requiring input from administrative agencies.
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distance education proviSIOns of the copyright law.
Understanding the practical operation of TEACH is important
for any institution that hopes to negotiate its use provisions
and compliance requirements. TEACH contains many
requirements and thus complicates the rather simple operation
of existing, albeit inadequate, copyright law as it functions in
distance education settings.

